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PREFACE 
The purpose ot this thesis is to trace the diplomatic career ot 
Henry Lane ilson, the Americen ambassador to Mexico during the first 
three Tears ot the Kexican ReTolution. Mr. Wilson was appointed ambassa-
dor late in 1909 by President Taft and served under three success1Te 
Mexican governments. Be was recalled by President Wilson August 4, 1913. 
As American ambassador e.nd dean ot the diplomatic corps in Mexico City, 
Mr. Wilson became an important intluence in Jlexican attairs during the 
Revolution under the administrations ot Diaz, Madero, and Huerta. This 
thesis is an attempt to explain his relationships with these governments. 
Whatever may be the verdict of tuture generations upon Kr. Wilson's 
conduct, it is certain that a study of his activities, as an otticial 
representative ot the United States government, is essential to more 
pleasant relations between the United States and Mexico, for such study 
brings to the surtace some of the causes for friction and misunderstanding. 
'!he writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Watt 
Stewart tor his guidance and helptul suggestions in connection w1 th the 
work and to Professors O. A. Bil ton, T. H. Reynolds, and Edward F. Willis 
for their constructive criticism. For assistance in the routine prepara-
tion, the writer is deeply indebted to his wite, Barbara Younger . 
E.E.Y. 
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HENRY LANE WIISOB AND THi MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1910-1914 
Chapter I. The Rule ot Porfirio Diaz: Causes ot the ReTOlution 
J'ust as a photographic portrait is obscure unless presented againSt 
a suitable background, so are the actions ot a man or a policy ot govern-
aent often difficult to fathom except as they are viewed against the 
baclr8r<>und o:t existing circumstances, which are themselves outgrowths ot 
historical torces. A knowledge of the trend of Ken08ll attairs during 
the Diaz regime and at the rise ot Francisco Madero serves to illuminate 
the career o:t Henry Lane Wilson as ambassador to Mexico troa 1910 to 1913 
and to indicate the motives which actuated him to play a decisive role 
1n the overthrow ot the popular and democratically-intentioned Madero 
government. 
'fhe rule ot Porfirio Diaz was a lllOat signiticant phase in the 
history ot the llexican Republic. '?his extraordinary ruler ca.me to the 
presidency in 18'76, and with the exception ot tour years, was Kexico•s 
chief executive tor a period ot thirty-five years, or until 1911, when 
he was swept trom power by a revolution led by Francisco Jladero.l 
During the years 1880-1884, though not president 1n name, he re-
mained the dominant influence in the Mexican government by securing the 
election ot a recognized "tool" to do his bidding.2 
Having torced his way into office in 1876 on a platform ot "no 
reelection", Diaz could hardly attord to succeed hilllSelf at the end of 
tour yearf. But since his first term had been deToted in a large way 
lrrank Tannenbaum, .!!!.!. Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 138, 139. 
2Ibid. 
I 
to the building ot a political machine, he was able to have elected an 
old "companion-in-arms" , am.er "place-holder" , General :uel Gonzales 
upon 111:lose retirement after one term he could depend.3 
With the expiration or the Gonzales administration on November 30, 
1894, Porfirio Diaz the next day began the long rule4 which is consider-
ed the most constructive of the one hundred-year period during the re-
public to 1911. lie gave 11&xioo political peace and stability and ma.de 
this aspect ot Mexican affairs the background for industrial growth.5 
In order to retain political peace, as well as to satisfy his 
ambition tor power, Diaz "planned indefinite self-perpetuation" .6 He 
was eleoted f!l'Hry tour years, but as time went on, the elections became 
bare ":Political formulas" kept up tor "appearance sake and less and 
less compatible w1 th the desires ot the people". 7 
Perhaps, his greatest asset as an administrator was his ability 
to choose coalition cabinets composed ot capable men from the several 
political factions then existing.a It was a new condition in Mexican 
political att~irs tor the vanquished party to be rewarded with ottice.9 
In breaking the old tradition, Diaz won over many opponents by 
giTing them priYileges. Those he could not conciliate tarougb. pur-
chase and reward, he exiled or had assassina.ted.10 
3Ernest Gruening, Jle:tico and Its Heritage, p. 
4He:rbert Ingram Prieatly,~e-.;xican Ration, 
5'rannenbaum, .22.• .!!!•, p. 139. 
6Gruen1ng, on. cit., p. 56 • 
. ,, .... -
Tannenbaum, .21?.. cit. , p. 139. 
8l>riestly, on. ci't.7 p. 379. 
9 ~ -Gruening,$:?.• cit., P• 56. 
lOibid. -
55. 
!_Bistorz, p. 2'19. 
2 
-·----
A third policy which President Diaz soon developed to stifle 
opponents was that ot playing ott his supporters against one another 
betore they had gained aut:ticient strength to oppose him. In this 
manner active opposition was either pac1:tied or ruthlessly crushed.11 
Regardleas o:t his tactics to secure a long tenure o:t ottiee, Diaz 
is recognized by his worst enemies as having J1ade great contributions 
to Mexico's prosperity.12 When he became president, Mexico was ruined 
by civil war; it had no capital at home and no credit abroad. Agri-
culture was at a low ebb, the cogs or industry were clogged, and modern 
transportation was almost non-existent. A general lack of interest 
among the people seemed to dispel hope tor Mexico's improvement. '!he 
long dictatorial regim.e has been described as a struggle ttbetween 
General Diaz and General Apathy with Diaz the Victor".13 
By 1911 when the aged Dictator was forced into exile, the Mexican 
government ,had credit abroad and a surplus or reTenue 1n the exchequer. 
15,000 .miles or railroads had been constructed, ports deTeloped, water 
power harnessed, and cities :modernized and beautitied.14 
Some ot the most sueceastul Diaz reforms were .made in the realms 
ot the national treasury by the Frell.Ch Creole Jose .lTes i1mntour, a 
Portirian appointee as minister ot fiilanc.e. Taking advantage ot the 
long peace in llexioo, Lillla.ntour secured the suppression of the alcabala, 
3 
an iDherited Spanish tax which had hampered internal trade tor centuries; 
changed the money standard trom gold to silver so that the value of silTer 
llPrtestly, .2E.• ill•, p. 380. 
l2Ib1d, p. 390. 
l3•Kexico and Its Kakertt, World's Work, XXII (J'une, 1911), 14431-3. 
l4Ibid; Tannenbaum, .2£.• ill•, P• 'ffi:" 
would not undergo severe fluctuations; and effected a thorough organi-
zation of the Mexican banking system.15 
'lhese reforms brought into l4exico a flow or foreign capital which 
4 
increased national production, developed commerce and industry, multiplied 
factories by the thousands, and created employment for many.16 
Furthermore, the injection of foreign capital, with a subsequent 
turn ot the wheels of industry, increased the national income trom nine-
teen million to one hundred and thirty-six million dollars, Near the 
close of the Diaz rule, the Surplus amounted to the latter sum, From 
this sum sixty-one millions had been spent on public works while seventy-
five millions remained as a cash balance.17 
Coming to power at a time when Mexico was at odds with many of her 
neighbors, Diaz wasted little time in resuming intercourse with all for-
eign countries.ls 
Meanwhile, another obstacle to economic penetration of Mexico by 
alien investments had been. removed. Security of both life and property 
became a reality. Under Diaz, Mexico with the aid of her rurales, army, 
and municipal gendar es, "became the safest country in the world, without 
exceptionff. In 1910 it was the "fairest and brightest e::rample of His-
panic American sclidity".19 
Andy-et a revolution, which was to last a decade, broke out; the 
l5priestly, .21?.• cit., pp. 390-93. 
l6Ibid. -
17Gruening, .2.12.• cit., p. 62. 
l illiam. Spence Robertson, History 2! ~ Latin American Nations, 
p. 57. 
19Fr1estly, .2.E.• ill•, p. 393; Tannenbawp.,.2.E.• ill•, p. 140. 
Diaz power crumbled; and "the glory o:f' Mexico proved to be evanescent." 
'!he dicta.tor and able politician had been guided by two "complementary 
springs", one being ambition for power and the other, material pros-
perity for his nation. His ambition was realized, but his plan for 
the salvation ot Mexico failed because o:f' a one-man rule and a lack 
ot wisely-administered justice. Re had overlooked the importance of 
a lower class which required education for the good ot the nation.20 
Impressive evidences of' progress in llexico covered weaknesses that 
were to bring the apparent great work of Diaz to ru.in. In his efforts 
to bring .modern industrialization to his country, he had failed to de-
stroy the feudal foundation of the Mexican economic syste. Instead, 
"hot-house" industrialization .magnified the existing evils and brought 
forward many new ones of 1 ts own.21 
The Mexican dictator had tailed above all else to develop his own 
people. Prosperity showed no creative ef':f'ort on llexico's part, and the 
system through which better times had apparently been established solved 
none o:f' the nation's political, social, and economic problems. Diaz had 
fastened upon a nation of serfs the "shackles of political and economic 
servitude"22 which only a revolution could break.23 
During his time, less than twenty percent of the population was 
white. 'llle remaining eighty percent was composed chiefly or halt-breeds 
20priestly, op. eit., p. 38Q. 
21Tannanbaum, ~· .ill•, p. 142. 
22Gruening, E.R.• ill•, p. 65. 
23Stephen Bonsal, "Kexico After Diaz", North American Review, XCIV 
(September, 1911), 394. 
5 
or pure Indians who had little to do in the affairs of their country. 
The Indian and the mestizo were assumed to be "congenitally and utterly 
incapable of responsible citizenship". The time within the scope ot 
tour centuries had been too short tor this element of the population 
to learn proper control, according to the Diaz interpretation.24 
Deprived of effective representation in their government, the 
Mexican niasses, especially the agrarian class, found themselves at the 
mercy of their ruler who virtually gave away millions ot acres of their 
lands to his favorites or to foreign investors.25 The breaking up ot 
the village communal lands which had been cultivated by the natives 
since the days ot the Spanish eonquest26 reduced the village inhab-
itants to 7ear-around wage earners or resident workers on large estates 
where they became indentured laborers.2~ 
As the number of small landowners decreased and the village lands 
dise.ppeared, .more and more haciendas eame into e:xistellce.28 At the same 
time, the status of the lower class became almost intolerable. The Mex-
ican laborer, toreed by necessity to borrow money, found himself obligated 
in serTice to his landlord for his debts. He now became a sert.29 
To make matters worse f'or the laborer, his cost of living rapidly 
i~creased, as the country became industrialized without an equal increase 
in ges. Money wages for industrial laborers did increase but not so 
24 • Archer, "Collapse of' the Diaz Legend", eOlures Jlagazine,, 
XXXVII (August, 1911), 396. 
2!Soruen1ng, .2.E.• _ill.. , pp. 58-61. 
26Ibid. 
2'1i&'.iinenbawn, .2.E.· ill•, p. 151. 
28Ib1d. 
29Robertson, .2.'2.• ill•, p. 661. 
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With the greater masses in Mexico--the agricultural laborers. Rising 
prices with a stationary wsge and loss of lands created a general 
social unrest among the aTerage Mexicans.30 
The Indians, looked upon as the white taan's inferior3l were- in some 
7 
cases captured by tederal officials and taken to great plantations where· 
they were sold into bondage as slaves.32 Thus, many Mexicans had been 
reduced to "utter destitution" and to the lite ot beggars while slavery 
and the system of peonage had been fastened upon them.35 
Diaz had been able to initiate his program after the national con-
gress had become like "plastic clay" in his hands.34 Re had also "hand-
picked" the judiciary and gagged the prees35 so that oppoe1tio-n to his 
plans would have little chance to develop. 
He now launched upon a program which drew deeper resentment from. his 
already suffering people.36 Hoping to advance material progress for his 
impoverished country, w1 thout equal regard tor hWDBn values, Diaz invi t-
ed foreign capital under broad and lavish concessions. Foreign investors 
needed little encourag9Jllent. They took the Mexican constitution and by-
laws at their tace value and were not interested in that part ot their 
host's policy which was meant for the good of the Mexican people.37 
It Diaz refused to grant huge conc88sions by open proclamation, he 
30rtanneabaum., £.I?.• ill•, pp. 144, 149. 
31Ibid., p. 144. 
32Robertson, .2l?.• cit., p. 662. 
33Archer, loc. ci"t.'7 pp. 395-411. 
34Robertso;::--.2l?. • .2!.l•, p. 661. 
35Gruen1ng., .2R.• cit., pp. 56-58. 
36J. Fred Rippy, Tie' United States and :Mexico, p. 231. 
3'1S8lllUel Flagg Baiis, Diplomatic Histo'rz .2!, .!a!. United States., 
pp. 540-542. 
usually granted them in the secret places of his palace. O ttsi such 
privileges or taTors were awarded by close counsellors of the dictator 
who, it is said, sometimes lined their pockets with Yankee gold.38 Con-
8 
cessions and privileges were made not only to foreigners, but to generals, 
colonels, and other military leaders and to aristocratic civilians. 
Proti ts trom foreign concess.ions pai d the fees of small groups of 
Mexican lawyers, bureaucrats, and politicians, who lived in Mexico City, 
and made large estates tor foreign residents or created great dividends 
for their stockholders abroaa.39 The mass ot people, however, received 
few benefits trom Mexican progress in education, sanitation, public wel-
fare, and social improvement.40 They were politically gagged and 
straight-Jacketed4l and could do nothing but we.teh their ruler scatter 
privileges with both hands to capitalists who were mostly foreign. )(ex-
ico seemed to exist for the enrichment of' foreigners and a faTored few.42 
'lbese holders of foreign concessions, otten exempt from taxation, 
were favored against Mexicans. It was foreigner against Mexican, white 
man against Indian, and rich man against poor.43 Differences between 
Mexicans and foreigners were usually settled in court in favor of the 
latter, especially if' they were powertu.l.44 
The fllarge-minded" Terdict or the Diaz prosperity was given 
usually in glowing terms by the alien who had profited by the order 
38Rtppy, .2£• cit. • p . 311. 
39Gruening. ;-e1t. • pp. 58-56. 
'°Bemis, .2£• ci t::-pp. 540-542. 
41Bonsal, loc7"oi t., p. 393. 
42Archer, Toe. cit., p. 400. 
4:3Tannenbawii;° ; cit. • 151-152. 
~ening, op. cit., pp. 58-61; Francixco Bulnes, The Whole Truth 
about llexi.co, p. 193 tt. Quoted in Rippy, .22.• ill•, p. 3ll. 
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of Vexican affairs and hoped to profit by its continuance.45 
Concessions to t~reigners, especially Americans, aroused a "smoul-
dering, popular hostility in Mexico" which Diaz could keep down but which 
might burst aflame in horrible atrocities during unsettled conditiona.46 
In his declining yed.?'s he found himself between t110 strong :forces: the 
foreign inTestor and the mass ot his 01111 people. In an effort to hold to 
one of these forces, he permitted his ministers to surrender to foreign 
capital and tried to suppress his people.47 One writer has stated that 
he took his country through the Red Sea or civil war and anarchy but 
bowed do~ 'to- the Gol~en Calf.48 
Mexico's independence had become economic dependence upon the fo.r-
eign investor. Instead of becoming loyal Mexicans, the foreigners created 
a system of absentee landowning; they took their money away, lea.Ting 
only a meager part to the Mexican nation in taxes and wages; their in-
terests did not conform to the interests of the Mexican masses. 
Mexico had become the "safest country" in the world for tourists, 
commercial travelers, aristocrats, and foreign investors. b-ut not for 
the humble Mexican. There was little "security of life" for the Indian 
or peon.50 
Lowered standards of life for the masses, destruction of village 
orgall.ization, further development of' the peo.i, alienation. of Mex~ican 
natural resources by foreigners-all these cond1 tions formed a back.-
ground against which active revolt was soon to begin. 
45Araher, loo. cit., p. 396. 
46Bq1s , on. cit. , pp. 540-542. 
4"" ..:.,;. -•ttippy, on. cit., p. 231. 
48. -= -~rcher, loc. cit., p. 399. 
49priestly, .2E.,oc1t., pp. 15,16 ff. 
50Gruening, 2:2.• cit., pp. 63-65. 
Chapter II. The Early Revolution: The Rise ot Francisco :11.adero. 
Before the enthusiasm engendered by Mexico's centennial celebration 
other independence trom Spain had died away in 1910,1 the Revolution, 
which was to continue tor a decade in movements ot action and reaction, 
burst forth. It began with a revolt under Madero and was ended with 
the efforts of Obregon and Calles to regenerate the masses socially and 
to bridle foreign concessions.2 
The Madero revolt was political in its nature and was directed 
ms.inly against suppression of constitutional liberties under Diaz. But 
after becoming president, Madero allowed his political foes too many ot 
the new liberties which had been created as a result of the Revolution. 
Hardly two years had passed when both he and his vice-president, Pino 
Suarez, were lllUrdered.3 They tell as victims of a coup d'etat inspired 
by Diaz influences led by General Victoriano Huerta who represented 
the old military group in Mexico City.4 This coup had been actively 
encouraged and assented to by the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.5 
Following these .murders, Mexico was controlled tor more than a 
year by the Huerta regime which was a reaction toward the Diaz dictator-
ship. Its downfall was brought about July 15, 1914, atter steady re-
tusal ot President oodrow Wilson to recognize Huerta as the right:tul 
ruler of Kexieo.6 
lTannenbaum, .21?.• ill.•, p. 137. 
2Bemis, .21?.• ill•, pp. 544, 545. 
3Ibid. 
4Tannenbaw,,.21?.• ill•, p. 163. 
5Gruening, .21?.• ill.•, p. 566. 
6Bemis, .21?.• ill•, pp. 544, 545. 
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From the time of Huerta's resignation until the United States 
recognized the Carranza GoTernment, October, 1915, Mexico endured a 
period of confusion created by strife between various military leaders 
who advocated different types of reform. Carranza's regime lasted 
from October, 1915, to April, 1920. During this time e new constituti on, 
which embodied political, agrarian, economic, and social reforms, was 
promulgated. Carranza, howeTer, was not destined to see the practical 
results of these reforms. Since he was ruthless and corrupt in his 
dealings, he was overthrown and murdered in 1920.7 
From this point the Revolution was converted to orderly government 
and its reforms consolidated into definite policies and practical legis-
lation by Presidents Obregon and Calles.a 
For the actual initiation of the revolutionary movement, President 
Diaz was personally responsible. Forces of revolt were brought to 
proJllinence in March, 1908, after the publication ot an interview be-
tween the Mexican President and James Creelman, an American journalist. 
The article, appearing in Pearson's Magazine, quoted the Dictator as 
follows: 
No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire llb.en 
my presidential term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. 
••• I welcome an opposition party in the Mexican Republic. ••• It 
it can develop power, not to exploit but to govern, I will stand 
by it.9 
These statements f'rom the lips of Don Porfirio were much like an 
earthquake to the Mexican people and exceedingly startling to the 
world at large. Many Mexicans refused to believe the pronouncement 
7Ibid. 
81bid. 
9ror. ~., .!.2!!,, p. 348. 
11 
sincere. But as time went on and no denial was issued, a llil irl of 
political agitation, which had been fermenting for several years, 
broke loose. Already, powerful figures, seeing that the Dictator 
could not live forever, had laid plans for a favorable position in 
the race for president.10 
Organized opposition, though weak in its nature, had appeared 
in state elections as early as April, 1903. Peacetul demonstrations 
of protest had been suppressed by Diaz authorities by armed force 
through the use of which blood was shed. In 1905 Democratic Clubs 
were formed throughout the state of Nuevo Leon, a state convention 
was held in Mexico City, and a pl~tform was drafted with •no re-
election" as its. chief plank.11 
fuile this sort of discontent grew in the provinces, political 
schemes for securing the presidency were being ma.de by various Diaz 
supporters. The most powerful aspirants were General Bernardo Reyes, 
civil and military governor in the northeastern states and former 
minister of war, and Jose Ives Limantour, head of the strong intra-
goverillllental clique and former minister of finance. General Reyes, 
hoping to t~wart any plans Limantour might have for ascendancy, had 
organized in the frontier states Us.sonic lodges which were really 
political ward clubs. The stepping-stone for either candidate was 
to be. the vice-pm,esidency.12 
But their old chiet, Diaz, ever alert to the ambitions of either 
friends or enemies for the presidency, had different plans for both 
l~iestly, on. cit., 
11 .;;... .-For. Rel., 1911, p. 




Gruening, ~· .ill•, p. 91. 
Gruening, .22.• ill•, p. 91. 
12 
these men. He headed oft the Limentour threat by proving him techni-
cally ineli.aibe on the ground that his father, born in France, was 
only a naturalized Mexican·. To . defeat the purpose of General Reyes 
whose political organization had proposed already to name hi.Dl vice-
president, Diaz chose tor the post Ramon Corral, an arch-enemy or Reyes, 
and then completely disposed of the general by sending him. abroad on 
a fictitious type of mission.13 
'lhus, it soon became evident that the Creelman interview was a 
"typical piece or Diaz duplicity" designed to locate his opposition. 
To the Anti-Reelection Party which had been encouraged by the inter-
view, it seemed that Diaz not only planned reelection for himself in 
1910, but also to impose upon Mexico the choice of Ramon Cerral for 
vice-president. Since Corral represented the governmental clique in 
power, he was thoroughly unpopular. The opposition had hoped that 
Diaz would allow, at least, the tree choice of a vice-president in the 
approaching elections, for the Dictator was now in his eightieth year, 
and there was the probability that the vice-president would succeed 
him before the expiration 01' another six-year term. In such case, the 
selection of Corral tor vice-president meant a continuation ot Portirian 
policies.14 
Faced with this situation. the opposition, composed ohietly ot 
pro-Reyes and anti-Corral elements, became united as the Anti-Reelec-
tion Party. Leadership of the party fell to a group ot young political 
idealists headed by the intellectual Franc13co Madero.15 
l.3Gruening, ~· .ill•, p. 91. 
14For. Ilel., 1911, pp. 348,439; Gruening, .21?.• ill•, pp. 91, 92. 
15Gruening, .2.e,. cit. , p. 92. 
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The role played by this young idealist seems rather unusual wien 
his antecedents and early lif'e are considered. Madero was a rich 
landowner and a member ot the privileged class in Mexico. l:Us early 
lite was one of luxury and ease. Yet he became known as the apostle 
of the common people and directed the forces 1Uhich droTe from power a 
government partial to the interests of the propertied classes.16 Per-
haps the position he took may be explained by a brief sketch of events 
in his early career. 
The eldest ot a large family or thirteen brothers and sisters, 
he was born on a large hacienda in the State of Coahuila, on October 
4, 1883. Almost all the members of this family were well-to-do and 
not a tew of them were rich. their record as Mexicans was one of law 
abiding citizens. It is said that not one of them was ever a drunkard 
or a crilninal.17 
For the first ten years of his early .manhood, Francisco deToted 
his interest to improving the many large family estates. He introduced 
' 
modern agriculture, encouraged scientific irrigation, and took a lively 
interest in the miLeral resources ot the estates. In developing several 
14 
rich gold and copper mines, he made use of modern stamp mills and smelters.la 
'Ihese activities were to be of great political Significance to 
Madero. Because of his wise and humane treatment ot thouaands of natives 
on the estates, he gained a reputation as a friend to the common man and 
a toe ot peonage and contract labor. This reputation he obtained be-




tore he actually became interested in public questions.19 
Previous to his marriage in 1900 at the age of twenty-seven, he 
had given little attention to political activity. He describes his 
awakening to such affairs in this manner: 
Like the majority or my countrymen of the better classes, 
I was living a tranquil lite. ••• Public attairs concerned me 
little••• Like all the rest, I simply let myself drift with 
the stream., buoyed up by nothing but selfishness. 
My criminal indifference - a characteristic product of' 
the times - was subjected to a rude shock by the election 
massacres in Monterrey, April 2, 1903. This tragedy, Which 
was witnessed by some of' my kinsmen and friends, who 1111 th 
their own eyes saw the cowardly ambuscade prepared for the 
independent voters ot Monterrey, made a most pai ntul and 
lasting impression upon me.20 
From this time on, Madero took up the cause of the independent 
voters, first in Coahuila and then all over Mexico. To him went the 
credit for the foundation of the Benito 1uarez Democratic Clubs with 
branch chapters in almost every state. By 1905 he had become the 
acknowledged leader of all independent voters and openly campaigned 
against the Diaz government in the gubernatorial race of Coahuila. 
It was during this campaign that a warrant for his arrest was issued 
but recalled by President Diaz who already had the election well in 
hana.21 
After 1905 Madero set out to prepare for the next presidential 
election of 1910, especially after it was known that Diaz would seek 
reelection and would have for his running mate the discredited Ramon 






view when lf.adero in October, 1908, completed the publication of his 
book 1!!, Sucesion Presidencial, which was an open declaration ot his 
party's sentiments and served to influence public opinion against the 
reelection ot Diaz.23 
Like the Diaz promise ot retirement, it was a beacon light tor 
rebellion and was twice reprinted before 1910.24 It was a mild ex-
pression against the Diaz regime but took space tor the adilliration of 
the dictator as an indiTidual. After reviewing the history of the 
Mexican people and their grieTances, Madero interpreted absolutism as 
the source ot Mexican. evils and defined the immediate issues as "effect-
ive suffrage" and "no reelection". Fin.ally he urged Diaz to carry out 
his pledge to retire and perm.it the people to elect their successor 
without interterence.25 The book also emphasized the probability that 
a Corral administration would be even worse than that of Diaz.26 
Thus, it so happened that when Diaz announced his candidacy tor 
his eighth term which was to begin November 30, 1910, he was faced by 
a strong opposition which had met April 15, and nominated Madero for 
president and Vasquez Gomez, a former supporter of General Reyes, as 
vice-president.27 At first Diaz looked upon the Madero campaign with 
contempt and listened in a private interview to the latter outline his 
plans tor a political party.28 
But as Madero traveled oTer the coU11try during the 1910 campaign, 
~or. Rel., 1911, p. 348. 
24-- -Priestly, on. cit., p. 396. 
2!'..... .;;;£. --~bid.; Gruening, on. cit., 
2~ =-uM·or. Rel., 1911, p. 550. 
2~- -Ibid., p. 351. 
28pr1estly, .21?.• ill•, p. 39'1. 
P• 93. 
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fluently urging the people to rise against political tyranny and f'ight 
for constitutional government,29 he was watched closely by federal 
police who reported the nature of his :meetings and speeches. As soon 
as it became evident that personal attacks had been ma.de upon the die-
tator,30 Madero was arrested at onterey on June 5, only twenty-one 
days before the election date. He was charged with having concealed 
a :fugitive from justice, the :fugitive being lladero's own private secre-
tary who was habitually in Madero's house.31 The arrest was made as 
a result of intormation supplied by a close triend of Ramon Corral upon 
whom President Diaz placed the blame for lfa.dero's detention.32 
The captive was then taken to San Luis Potosi, convicted of se-
dition, and imprisoned. However, during his imprisonment he was al-
lowed to move about at liberty in the city of San Luis Potosi, after 
having made bail with the help of his friends. Four months later he 
escaped in disguise to San Antonio. Texas.33 
Meanwhile. on October 4, despite popular Madero demonstratio:ns 
throughout Mexico. the chamber ot deputies declared Diaz and Corral 
elected for another six years.34 A tew days later Madero, now oper-
ating from San Antonio, counter-charged with a specific revolutionary 
program. He announced in the press as leader of a revolutionary junta35 
and declared the recent elections null and void.36 
29Jor. Rel., 1911, p. 350. 
30priestly, -211• cit., p. 398. 
31For. Rel., 1911, p. 350. 
32Priestly, .21?.· cit., p. 398. 
33For.Rel., 19117"i. 350. 
MGruening, .21?.• cit •• p. 93. 
35:For. Rel., 1911, p. 350. 
36'oruening, .2.1?.• cit., p. 93. 
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The cause and purpose of the Revolution were explained in "The 
Plan of San Luis Potosi", a bold denunciation of the Diaz-Corral re-
election.57 Again the catchwords, "effective suffrage" and "no re-
_election", constituted the immediate objectives. But other signifi~ 
cant reforms called for a distribution of large estates held by a 
few rich landowners; restoration of lands taken from Indian tribes; 
liberation ot political prisoners, especially Indian prisoners of war 
who had been condemned to peonage; repudiation of the practice ot 
making soldiers out of convicted criminals; and last, but not least, 
guarantees for free speech and free press.38 
To execute this plan , revolutionary preparations were made while 
legal steps were taken by the Anti-Reelection Party to have the June 
elections set aside as fraudulent. The Party's electoral committee 
presented to the courts 150 election frauds, and then appealed to the 
national congress for a new election, when they were ret'llsed a hearing 
by the judiciary. Congress, also turned down the petition. The op-
position was now convinced that rebellion only would effect a change.39 
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In November Madero entered Mexico from Texas and began to organize 
his support.40 Already the news of revolt had spread like prairie tire. 
The plan had so greatly appealed to the discontented masses that al-
most everyone with a grievance in Mexico flocked around the Ma.dero 
standard.41 President Diaz at first refused to consider the situation 
37For. Rel., 1911, pp. 351,352. 
38iiiie'rsoii;" 100:-Cit., p. 619. 
30... - -~~or. Rel., 1911, p. 352. 
40i>'rresily, 22.• cit., p. 398. 
41.oruening, 22.. .ill.. , p. 94. 
serious but was tinally compelled to send troops into Chihuahua where 
disorders were rapidly spreading~ Though the troops were able to gain 
sufficient advantage to preserve the State, they could not suppress the 
revolt. On the other hand, Madero, not finding suftioient force for 
decisive action, returned to San Antonio in December.42 
Faced in this city with possible arrest for violation of neutrality 
laws, he re-crossed the boro.er into Chihuahua on February 14 (1911), 
and made attempts to consolidate all the rebel forces for a signal sue-
cess against federal troops. After several minor reverses, this ob-
jective was accompliShed at Ciudad J'uarez, opposite El Paso. Hare the 
rebels took advantage of mismanagement of tederal troops by Porfiro 
Diaz, J'r., who was directing the campaign in the illness of his father. 
On May 9, Ciudad J'uarez tell and with it went the prestige or the Mexi-
can government.43 
Almost two months before this decisive rebel victory, President 
Diaz had made political efforts to save the situation. He had induced 
the return trom Europe of Lima.ntour who was given the privilege of form-
ing a new coalition cabinet which woul d advocate reforms in keeping with 
the demands ot the Revolution. But since the revolutionary leaders con-
sidered all proposed reforms as forced upon the government, they refused 
19 
conciliation. Limantour then called an armistice and sent representatives 
to treat with the revolutionists who demanded the resignation of Diaz. 
When the demand was not met, the truce ended.44 
42priestly, .5?2.• ill• , pp. 398-399. 
43tbid., p. 399; Gruening, on. cit., p. 94. ""- .... -Priestly, ~· ill•, pp. 399-401; Gruening, 2.2.• ill•, p. 94. 
However, when the government received news of the def eat at Ciudad 
Juarez, it resumed negotiations which continued until May 21, when a 
treaty with the rebels was signed. By its terms, Diaz and Corral were 
required to resign and Francisco de la. Barra was to become acting presi-
dent until general elections were held. Diaz retu.sed to resign until 
pressure from disorders and mob violence in J.iexico City brought him to 
terms. He save up, May 25, l9ll. Corral's resignation was accepted 
by the chamber ot deputies along with that of Diaz.45 
The next day the aged dictator set out for the port city of Vera 
Cru.z under the protection of federal troops led by General Huerta. Here 
he boarded a German steamer and sailed away to end his remaining days 
in Paris.46 On the same day de la Barra assumed the presidency and ae-
20 
cepted a cabinet composed of revolutionaries. Eleven days later {June 7) 
the ffgreat apostleff Madero ffamid hozannas and strewn flowers" entered 
the cap1 tal. 47 
Primary elections were held October 1. and general elections October 
15. Choice of Jladero as president was almost unanimous while Pino Suarez 
rece1ve4 a clear majority for vice-president. The successful candidates 
were inaugurated November 6• l9ll, for terms to expire, November 30, 
1916.48 
The new president was a small man who weighed less than 135 pounds 
and was barely five :feet, tour inches high. His taee bore a kindly and 
4~1estly, ~· _ill., pp. 401,402. 
46w. Ritchie, "T.he Passing of a Dictator," Harpers, XCXXIV 
{April~ 1912), 782-789. 
4 Priestly, ~· ill•, p. 403. 
"8ibid. 
intelligent expression which made him appear to be a sympathetic figure. 
He possessed a eharac.ter of dogged perseverance and high moral and 
physical courage which almost became fanaticism when "partiotism or 
righting wrongs" were concerned.49 
He has b'een regarded as an impractical, weak dree.mer,50 and, at 
least, it ean be said that he was not a "strong man" in the same sense 
as was Diaz. Rather, he was "an energetic, worried little man, full of 
modern humane ideas". His personality seemed to inspire, rather than 
compel, and his strength was that of sympathy rather than force. He 
was a dream.er to the extent that he had faith in the ability of Mexico's 
people for the salvation of the nation. 51 
When he became president, Madero had already fulfilled one of his 
reTolutionary pledges. By conducting honest and peaceable elections,52 
21 
he had put llexico through the motion other first real political campaign. 
All votes in the tall elections had been cast with the semblance of free 
and universal aurrrage.53 
As president he was faced with the task of living up to almost im-
possible ideals which the hopes of his people demanded.54 To guide people, 
who had been politically gagged for many years and now called upon to 
live under the treest of institutions, would be no easy undertaking.55 
49.Emersoa, loo. cit., p. 615-621. 
50rannenbaum;-.21?.• cit., p. 158. 
51Arthur Ruhle, "Campaigning with Mr. Jif.a.dero", Colliers, XLOIII 
(Octob•r 28, 1911), 55. 
52Bonsal, loo. cit. , p. 592; Gruening, .2R.. ill. , pp. 94, 95; 
For. Rel., 19117P°. 514. 
- -rRuhl;:-i'oc. cit., pp. 18,35. 
~Ibid. p7'°35.-
5~al, loc. cit., p. 393. --
Madero's success or failure would be determined by a number of cir-
cumstances. Perhaps the most important were {l) his own ability to 
handle situations as they arose, (2) the cooperation given to his 
administration by the people ot Kexico, and (3) the degree to which 
the United States would encourage or discourage the Madero program. 
'l.he rest of this study will be devoted primarily to the position 
taken toward the Mexican situation by the United States Government as 
embodied by the Taft administration through the American Ambassador, 
Henry Lane Wilson. 
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Cb.apter III. Ambassador Wilson a.nd the American Interests, 
1910-1912. 
Henry Lane Wilson was born November 3, l.857 at Crawfordsville, 
Indiana, of a well-to-do Scotch-Irish family. At the age ot twenty-
two he was graduated from Wabash College at Crawfordsville and began 
the study of law in the office ot Benjamin Harrison. A tew years later 
he became the editor and owner of the J"ournal ,2! Laf'ayette, to-r a short 
time, and then moved to the state of Washington where he practiced law, 
engaged in real estate, and became a banker. Here also he began his 
political career by managing his brother's campaign for the United 
States senate in 1895. Not long atter this political activity, Wilson 
represented his state on the committee that notified McKinley ot his 
nomination. In 1904 during the Roosevelt campaign, he traveled over 
the various states of the nation to ascertain the feeling of the voters 
toward the approaching election.l 
His initial service as a diplomat began in 1897 under President 
McKinley who appointed him. minister to Chile where he remained until 
1904. As a reward tor hi,s aid to Roosevelt in the election, he re-
quested a diplOlllatic post in Europe and was appointed JD.inister to 
Belgium, March 8, 1905. With more than ten years experience in the 
diplomatic 3erv1ce, Wilson was then chosen by President Tart late in 
1909 as ambassador to Mexico where he became a vigorous defender of' 
American interests during the overthrow of Diaz and the Revolution.2 
lniotiona.ry .2!. American Biography, XX, 325. 




By his antecedents and associations, Wilson before long became recog-
nized as the champion or erican business interests and concessions 
in exieo. 
side trom his experience as a diplomat, his appointment was due 
to the political influence of his brother, former Senator John M. Wilson, 
a political boss of the state of Washington. Senator Wilson was a close 
political associate.of President Tatt's first secretary of the interior, 
Richard Ballinger, who as also from the state of l,ashington.3 Mr. 
Ballinger's intimate relations with the Guggenheim.S were made conspicu-
ous by the disclosures of the famous Ballinger-Pinchot controversy of 
1909.4 In Mexico, the GuggenheimS owned the American Smelting and 
Ret'ining Company which beoam.e a competitor to the vast :Madero smelting 
interests which, it will be recalled, were first developed by Francisco 
Madero himself.5 
Soon after his arrival in exico, during the closing days of the 
Diaz govermuent, it is said that Ambassador ilson was surrounded by 
a small clique, "which in his protecting shadow, was determined to get 
rich quicker and was not over-particular as to the means employed". 
This group known in Mexico as the "Society of Friends or the Ameri~n 
Ambassador", who represented only themselves but tried to speak tor the 
entire American oolony, was composed of business men or those r .epresent-
1ng business interests. Its numbers included a personal represen'\ati~e 
3Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Ke:doo, pp. 129-133. 
4L. R. Ola.Tis, "~Whitewashing of Ballinger: Are the GuggenheiJBs 
in charge ot the Department or Interior?" Colliers, :n.IV (November 13, 
1909), 15,15; Senate Document No. 248,61 cong., 3 sess., pp. 168-179; 
Senate Re:pgrt ~. 719,61 cong., 3 seas., pp. 283-291. 
baell, !U?.• .ill.•, pp. 129-133; Emerson, ..12£• ill•, p. 619. 
ot an American petroleum magnate, a former judge in the Orient, a 
lawyer, a business man who supplied furniture to business offices, a 
newspaper publisher, and a banker.6 The ambassador was personally a 
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strong advocate of the Taft-Knox ttdollar d1plo.raacy"7 and became a "spear-
head" in Mexico ot the larger business elements that feared a general 
loss or their advantageous position.a 
Since the Diaz government was rounded on the major premise that 
foreign capital was to have its way unhampered, relations between 
Mexico and the United States had been pleasant as a rule for several 
years. Before the coming of Wilson upon the scene, it was believed 
that former Ambassador David Thompson was "as active in business as 
in diplomacy".9 Therefore, it would seem that the new ambassador was 
setting no precedent in his early beginnings as a champion of .American 
interests. The varied concessions and huge American investments which 
Mr. Wilson would appear to represent cannot be ascertained with a great 
deal of accuracy since the several estimates have differed as to ape-
cific figures. 
According to the estimate of llarion Letcher, United States consul 
at Chihuahua, American investments in 1912 amounted. to $1,05'1,770,000, \ 
a SWl1 greater than all other foreign interests combined and almost 
tWiae the Talue of wealth owned b1 Mexicans. To go a bit f'llrther, the 
report showed that citizens of the United States owned one-half of the 
total wealth in the entire republic.10 The Fall Committee of 1919 
SGruening, .21?.• ill•, p. 561. 
'?Ray Ste.nnard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Li_fe ~ Letters, IV, 239. 
8Gruening, .2lt• ill•, pp. 95., 96. 
9Ibid., p. 559. 
lOiiii'y Consular~ ~rade Reports (1uly 18, 1912), p. 316. 
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rejected Leteher's report and placed the .American total at one and one- ~ 
half billions. It showed, also, that American enterprises controlled I 
l 
78 percent ot Mexican mines, 72 percent of the smelting industry, 68 
percent of oil developm_ent, and 68 percent of the rubber output. By 
1911, from forty to seventy-five thousand Americans had established 
their homes in Mexico.11 
( 
This economic invasion of Mexico by her neighbor of the North was 
begun first by railway builders who entered on a large scale and by 1902 
possessed holdings to the amount ot 300 million dollars. At the close 
of 1911, valuation of this enterprise had increased to 655 .millions 
while statistics showed that Americans had constructed two-thirds of 
the 16,000 miles of railroads. Following the lead .made by these pro-
moters, miners from the United States came next with properties valued 
at 95 millions in 1902 and 250 million dollars nine years later, after 
the smelting industry had been added. A great deal of the mining was 
done by vast business concerns such as the Hearst Estate and the Guggen-
heims. Auxiliary investments included property ot chemists, ore testers, 
and refiners valued at seven .million dollars in a group ot ntne statea.12 
Equally significant were the American holdings in Mexican land. Its 
acqu1s11.1on was begun by railroad and mining companies, which of'ten 
bought large tracts of ranching, tar.ming, and timber lands, but was 
continued by ranohmen, land speculators, planters, and small farmers. 
For example, by 1902 the Sonora Land and Cattle Company with head-
llFall Committee, Report , II, 3322, 3313. 
12House Document No. 305, 37 cong., 2 sess., I, pp. 433-435, 503-
505; Daily Consular !!.2. Trade Reports (July 18, 191a), p. 316. 
2'1 
quarters at Chicago owned 1,300,000 acres in Sonora. In Chihuahua the f 
' 
Hearst Estate acquired one-tourth o:f a million acres, and just across 
the border ot New exieo, the American-owned Palomas Land and Cattle 
Company possessed two million acres. Such holdings were :found in al-
most every Mexican state, especially in tropical regions where sugar, 
cotton, rubber, coffee, and tropical :fruits could be produced. As to 
the smaller holdings, it was estimated in 1912 that 15,000 Americans 
were residing in exieo permanently and cultivating small tracts. In 
1902 total American investments in exican lands tell between 28 and 30 
million dollars. Ten years later, these holdings had more than doubled 
to the sum of 50 to 80 million.13 According to Professor Rippy, "Mexico 
was rapidly becoming a land of large American estates.14 
In the tield of petroleum. and its products, American capital was 
introduced first by Doheny and other business en of California, after 
the first well was drill.ed in 1902. The investments or this group grew 
so rapidly, :f.'rom one million dollars in 1907 to 70 millions by 1922, 
that other concerns steadily followed until 290 companies :f.'rom the 
United States had been organized with total investments ot 90 million 
dollars. O:t' a miscellaneous nature, American interests in 1902 in-
eluded manufacturers and toundry men who had property valued at ten 
million dollars in nineteen states, bank and trust and investment com-
panies which held in three s t ates seven million dollars; and public 
utility companies, druggists, merchants, grocers, and hardware men, all 
l3Daily Consular !!!! Trade Reports (.Tuly 18, 1912), p. 316; House 
Document, No. 305, 57 cong. , 2 seas. , I, p. 436; ~ Committee, Repor t, 
II, 3312. 
14Rippy, ~· ill•, p. 314. 
ot whom together controlled vast interests.15 At this time 51 percent 
ot exico•s imports and 77 percent of her exports came from or went to 
the United States .16 
When Ambassador Wilson came to Mexico, it was estimated that 19 
percent of her population was foreign or Am.ericanl7 and that 100,000 
people trom the United States were engaged in some form of business. 
theret8 A popular phrase ran current that Mexico was the "foreigner's 
mother and the Mexican•s stepmother". Felix Diaz, a nephew of the dic-
tator, called his country the "mistress" of the United States.19 This 
large stake of American interest was to exert a great influence directly 
and indirectly upon the tuture affairs of that nation. 
IM.r . Wilson had been in Mexico less than a year when he began using 
his diplomatic post to suppress all anti-American sentiment. His first 
attack was made upon the Menca.n newspapers in November, 1910, when an 
article called the "Cloven Hoot of Dollarism" appee.red in El Debate. ----
The article, inspired by the burning alive by a Texas mob ot a Mexican, 
charged with rape and murder, was sufficient to cause the ambassador to 
direct notes of an exciting nature to both the Mexican Minister of For• 
eign Affairs end to ashington. To Secretary ~ox he wrote that the 
article had tor its ttevident purpose" to "excite public opinion and to 
incite the populace to violence" end that it had produced such results. 
l5Fall Committee, Report, I, 20'7; House Document No. 305, 57 cong., 
2 sees .-:-r,- 503-505; Consular Reports (July 18, 1912), p. 316. 
16William Spence Robertson, Hispanic American Relations rn, ~ 
United States,App., p. 419. 
17"The American Interest in Mexico", World's ~. XXVI (February, 
1911) 13950. 
la"Mexico: A Review", Outlook, XXVII (May 16, 1914), 112. 
191Uppy, .21?.• ill•, P• 331. 
26 
He went on to explain how the agitation had led to the "assemblying 
ot a mob" from. which "inflammatory" speeches were made. The aob had 
then marched. to the American-owned daily, 1'!!.!, Jlexican Herald, and at-
tacked the building with stones, threatening the safety of the Herald 
employees. end later in the night. the group of arauders had assumed 
"dangerous proportions and malignant character", committing further 
acts of "Tandalism".20 
Mrs. A. D. cClaren, who spent many years in Mexico and who was 
present at the time of these incidents, wrote to a friend in the United 
States that the mobs did not really amount to much but consisted chief-
ly of "half-grown boys, students, perhaps", who resented the manner of 
lynching more than just an ordinary execution. She was conT1nced that 
the whole thing was a "farce".21 Nevertheless, a visit by the ambassa~ 
dor to President Diaz brought about the prompt extinction of!!_ Debate. 
A few days later, Mr. Wilson sent to the president a written demand 
for action against the Catholic daily!!. E!!!_ and the Diario ~ Bogar 
tor their anti-American articles, and Enrique C. Creel, the Kexican. 
foreign minister, ordered them suppressed as "un-patriotic".22 
President Diaz maintained that these demonstrations and newspaper 
comments were not indicative of anti-American sentiment on the part 
of his people but were a by-product of anti-Diaz feeling.23 It this 
20ror. !!!•, 1911.pp. 354, 355; Ram.on Prida, 12!. _!!. Dictadura !. ~ 
Anar ~ia, I, 162, quoted by Gruening, 22.• .ill.•, p. 560. 
:Alice Day llcClaren, "The Tragic Ten Days of .Madero", Scribners, 
LV (January. 1914), 100. 
22For. Rel., 1911,pp. 355-363. 
23-- -For. ~., .ill.!., p. 360. 
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were the case, then the incoming Madero government, which was es-
sentially friendly to the United States democracy, could hope for 
pleasant relations between the two countries, tor the apparent happy 
condition ot the people under the Goverrunent to the north was a goal 
to which the Maderists proposed to work. But the opposite happened. 
Instead ot a decrease in anti-Americanism under Madero, it increased 
as time went on, and the source of much of it could be traced to the 
opposition of Ambassador .ilson to Madero and "everything he repre-
sented." On frequent occasions the ambassador was publicly hissed.24 
In the beginning, President Taft had looked upon the M.aderist 
government through "conventional, legal eyes" and immediately re-
cognized it. But soon both the president and Secretary Knox became 
alarmed to the extent that the;r fee.red Madero would not be sutticient-
ly able to protect American interests according to their existing 
legal rights.25 However, Secretary Knox maintained a policy of 
moderation and restraint during the era of revolution. In general, 
the Tatt administration followed the policy of dollar diplomacy in 
relation to Mexico.· Throughout the Madero administration the atti-
tude of the United States was friendly and the diplomatic notes dis-
patched to exico by Secretary Knox were, with few exceptions, temper-
ate and courteous. Yet, President Taft maintained in Mexico an 
ambassador who was openly hostile to the Madero government. As a 
rule, Wilson's activities were heartily approved at Washington. The 
24Edi th O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days, p. 37; Gruening, 2.£• ill•• 
pp. 561,562. 
25J3emis , .2.1?.. .ill• , p. 546. 
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ambassador was given much freedom of action and his conduct as a repre-
sentative of the United States government was seldom g_uestioned. 
The fears of Taft and Knox came, no doubt, from the revolutionary 
president's seeming inability to put down armed revolts in both north-
ern and southern Mexico, ·but they were further elevated by the American 
ambassador's notes to the department of state. Several months before 
Madero came to of'fiee, during the provisional government of de la Barra, 
Mr. Wilson wrote two confidential notes to Se7retary Knox and expres-
sed fear that the Madero rule "might lead to disrespect of constituted 
authority". On June 11, 1911, he listed in detail probabilities for 
.Madero's failura.26 As to the new president's policy toward the United 
States, it was a "mild reaction" from the Diaz "subservience". Madero 
had written in his ,!:!. Sucesion Presidencial nthat each concession con-
stitutes a precedent and many precedents constitute a right".27 
This statement within itself might have be~n sufficient to make 
of the American ambassador a "presser" of claims for his weal thy 
friends. At least, he continued to play that role, and his inability 
to get quick results from these claims aroused within him a resentful 
feeling that may be detected in his reports to ashington.28 On Jan-
uary 23, 1912, he wired: 
Mexico is seething with discontent- -principally e.mong the 
higher and educated classes, who in the final analysis must rule 
this country••• At this present moment the area of actual anQ 
open rebellion against the GoTernment is not inconsiderable.29 
Later, on February 20, Mr. Wil.son became so greatly alarmed 
26Joor. Rel., 1911, p. 509. 
2~- -Gruening, .2£.• cit., pp. 561,562. 
28ibid. ~ 
29for:" Rel., 1912, p. 714. -- -
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oTer the "danger of the situation" that he assumed enough responsi-
bility to confer with Kadero•s most pronounced opponents tor the sake 
of a better "moral effect" upon the country. In th.is instance, it 
seems that he failed to consider the thought that sueh action on the 
part of an ambassador would place Madero in an interior position and 
would leave the impression that the president could not direct his own 
affairs. In explanation, Kr. Wilson wrote: 
I haTe recently been so deeply impressed with the danger of 
the situation and so profoundly apprehensive or the responsibilities 
which the downfall of the Madero Government would place upon our own 
GoverJllllent that in addition to affording this GoverDJ11ent eTery parti-
cle of information and advice which I thought of use or benefit, I 
have most discreetly and carefully, through reliable persons gener-
ally, but directly in two instances, endeavored to induce leading 
memeers of' the Catholic Party, of the old regime, and of the com-
mercial elements of the. city to make s:>me demonstration of a public 
character, coupled with a tender ot serTice and support, as might 
have a moral effect upon the country at large. I believe such a 
moment is now under contemplation.30 
In less than a year, the ambassador was to confer again 1'11 th 
me.m.be.rs of the old regime, this time, not for moral effect but for the 
overthrow ot the only government which represented a national desire in 
exico. But as tor the more illllediate effects of his alarmism as ex-
pressed in his notes to Washington, he was to so.me extent responsible 
tor the .mobilization of' the entire l:"egular army of the United States on 
the Mexican border, February 4, 1912. To a great part of the Mexican 
population, this act was interpreted as meaning disapproval of the 118.dero 
governaent, and whatever might have been the motive of the United States, 
the 100,000 man-power demonstration Titally affected the Mexican govern-
ment.31 
30Ibid. , p. 723. 
3J.oruen1.ng, SU1• ill•, p. 562. 
Giving enoourage.m.ent to practically all hostile persons and groups, 
it stimulated rebellion, encouraged banditry, and to Madero, was "a 
thrust which it is scarcely an exaggeration to number with the wounds 
that killed him. And it spilled rivers of blood in Mexico. n32 The 
opposition used this military threat f'l!'om the United States as c means 
ot stirring up popular fear of intervention under the Madero government 
which they claimed was too weak to proteot the nation.33 
In the United States many leadi ng newspapers supported President 
Taft's armed threat to exioo, but out of the general voice or ap-
roval came dissent and critieism.. The .New York Globe argued that how-
ever weak the Jradero government was, it was the best thing in sight 
and that the wisdom ot turther weakening it was not "ma.nitest". 'lba 
Tatt administration, affirmed the New York World, was under "tempta-
tion to play with fire.n34 
It is true that in the course of' frequent revolts under Madero, 
losses of both lite and property were suffered by foreigners and Mex-
icans alike during the development ot considerable lawlessness in 
scattered regions. Madero tound himself face to face with a varied 
and strong opposition as soon as he became president. In Ais attempts 
to live up to his promise to restore political liberty, he permitted 
his enemies the opportunit1 to betray his government. Arrayed against 
him were the land barons, the clericals, and the political "outs" - the 
same ring ot men who surrounded Diaz and made his rule finally unbear-
32J3ell, .21?.• cit., p. 148. 
33"Warning Meirco" , Literary Digest, XLIV (April 27, 1912), 670,871. 
34Ibid. 
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able: the money centers or the world, including Wall Street and the 
Morgan interests; larger business groups 1h general, especially Ameri-
can, who teared the passing of the concessionaire system and cheap labor; \ 
a .miscellaneous mass or people who had turned against the new regime 
when they tailed to receive personal profit trom it; and the disin-
herited peasantry, especially the agrarian division ot the South led by 
Zapata.35 
Ot this last element, Zapata, an Indian from Morelos , had joined 
the Jla.derists during the Revolution because of their promise to re-
store the confiscated lands, but had resumefl fighting when Madero was 
slow in bringing about radical agrarian reforms. Zapata's rebellion 
continued to grow until in 191.2 several states were attected.36 
In the North, Pascual Orozco , another former Ms.derist, disappoint-
ed because Madero refused to pay him one hundred thousand pesos tor 
his service in the Revolution, began a second agitiation financed by 
the Terrazas family, weal thy land barons of Chihuahua. General Luis 
Terrazas was the father-in-law ot Enrique c. Creel, a member of the 
old Diaz governmental clique, a banker, and part-American who had 
readily acquiesed in the American .ruabassador's demand that the two 
Mexican newspapers be suppressed. beoa.u.se of their anti-American articles. 
General Terrazas, piqued at Madero' s ef:tor-ts to have his twelve-million 
acre estate surveyed ·and appraised tor just taxation, had joined his 
35Dolores Butterfield, "Situation in Jlexico" , North American Review, 
CXCVI (November, 1912), 649; John A. Avireite, "The Situation in Mexico", 
Colliers, XLVIII (18.lluary 27, 1912), 14; Gruening, .2£• cit., p. 95. 
36nolores Butterfield, "'ihe Conspiracy Against Madero", Forum, L 
(October, 1913}, 469; Gruening, 2.£• ill•, pp. 141-144. 
interests with those of Creel to torm a strong financial support ot 
the Oro~co rebellion.3' 
In less than one month after the mobilization of the United States 
army on the ~xioan border, Orozeo initiated his revolt through a mutiny 
of the garrison at Ciudad Juarez. March l, 1912. Even though the sei-
zure or this city made his forces seem formidable, they never numbered 
ltl.Ore than tive or six thousand men and soon became disorganized into 
lawlessness. However, the insurrection b came a. target tor the Me:r:i-
can press which was controlled chiefly by the old group of politic.al 
"outs". 1oined by the capitalist foreign press, it assailed Madero 
and his policies on every hend.38 
To make matters worse for the president, Ambassador Wilson "pricked 
and harassed the Government W1 th every grieTance, real, manufactured, 
or imagined" end his notes to Secretary Knox were tilled with greater 
tension as news of the Orozco uprising spread. On March 2, he urged 
.Americans to abandon different sections of Mexico. It is interesting 
to note that other foreign diplomats were not equally concerned, tor 
they sent no similar warnings to their nationals.39 
Two weeks later he telegraphed the tlepartment ot state for arms -
500 ritles and a.mm.uni tion for selt-de:t'ense to be sent to the "Arms and 
Ammunition Committee of the American Colony".40 With the assent ot the 
government to the first order,41 the 8.lllbassador ma.de a similar request, 
3'f:Butterf'ield, ibid., pp. 4-69,470; "Our Course 1n the Mexican War", 
Review of' Reviews , xtm' (lla.y, 1911), 533-538. 
!sititter:f'ield, ~., p. 470; Gruening., .2R.• ill•, pp. 302,562. 
39For. Rel., 1912, p. 731; Gruening,~· cit., p. 562. 
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arch 22, on the behalf of the Amerioan Colony Committee ror one thou-
sand Krag-Jorgenson rifles and 250 , 000 cartridges. The next day he 
demanded treble the number of cartridgea.42 Mrs. MoClaren, an Am.eri-
ca!! resident in Mexico City, wrote on April 5 to a friend in the States 
that so much had been said about the Capital being entered that she and 
her husband had begun "to mock". She ex lained that every time a tire-
cracker was explod$d they looked at each other in a Jesting way and 
said, ''They are taking the Ci t:y11 • 
To explain a previous falsely-reported disturbance, she related 
an incident which occurred while she was dining with~ diplomat. 
During the dinner, when a ma.id rushed in and reported :fighting at a 
certain place, the diplomat arose and immediately telephoned a news-
paper.man of the incident. The reporter, not taking the call at its 
face value, rushed to the scene of action to find only a sleeping 
village. Inquired :Mrs. 11cC1aren of her friend, 11.A.re the man's dis-
patches to his government as f'renzieed as this?" She explained that 
the occurrence was a small matter but that "it might happen equally 
well in a large one." Though the lady did not reveal the name ot this 
diplomat, the incident migbt tend to show that official reports were 
sometimes exaggerated. Other of her l1;ttters left a similar impression 
ot both the press and diplomatic circles.43 
Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson continued his requests for more munitions. 
On March 25, he made an addition.al order which threw a new light upon 
his insistent demands. The telegram to Washington ran as follows: 
42Ibid., p. 756. 
43iicoraren, ..!2.£. ill•, p. 101. 
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Mr. George w. Cook and Mr. Emanuel Beck, waalthy and responsi-
ble Am.eric.ans in llexico City, desire trom patroitie motives and on 
their own responsibility to order an addiiional 1,000 rifles, 1,000 
tield-serTice belts, and 1,000,000 cartridges, to be shipped with 
and in the same manner and tor the same purpo~e as represented in 
the order sent through the Department by telegram ••• This should 
leave Bew York City on next Thursday and as part ot the original 
order.44 
This time, the Department wired back that it was "disinclined to 
accede" to the request of Cook and Beck without more information re-
gardin.g the urgency of arms and the purpose for which they were to be 
used.45 However, three days later a large shipment was dispatched on 
a Ward Line steamer, consigned to Wilson and invoiced to the military 
attache, supposedly to be used for the protection of the American 
colony.46 
That the munitions were used tor the purposes specified by Mr. 
Wilson is to be doubted. On May 3, the Madero government expelled 
from Mexico two naturalized Americans as pernicious foreigners, when 
it became known that they were conducting a mail order business under 
the 'JlWlle of the Tampico News Company which was delivering arms and 
munitions to the rebellious Zapata. Later it was learned that two 
directors of this so-called N.ews Company were members of the e.mbas-
sador's inner circle. One was none other than • Beck, president 
of' the Mexico City Banking Corporation, tor whom Mr. Wilson had 
solicited arms; the other was Mr. Beck's attorney, Burton • Wilson, 
an American lawyer.47 
On August 22 (1912) the Ambassador informed Washington that con-
44For. Rel., 1912, p . 758. 
45Ibid. 7°P. 7~ 
46Ibid., p. 758. 
4*fBell, ~· ill•, pp. 202,203. 
ditions 1n six states were "as bad as at any time during the two 
revolutions, if' not worse" and that the government was apparently 
"incompetent to meet the situation ••• "48 Two hours later he advised 
oalling the president's attention to the 
••• growing anti-American spirit ot the lls.dero aclm.1nistration, 
which not only shows a decided preterence tor European markets in 
all lines. but is harassing and discriminating against America.Jl 
interests, at the ins:tigation of' a group ot corrupt men. who sur-
round the president, and manitested recently in the lockout ot 
the American employees ot the railways, in the persecution ot the 
Associated Press, and the one American newspaper in Me:dco·, in the 
Government's suborned decision in the Tlahualilo case, in the dis-
criminatory and almost confiscatory tax placed on the oil products 
or Tampico, and in the present attemp~ to annul the concession of 
the Mexican National Packing Co. in spite of' the protests of the 
Embassy and the British Legation, which annulment would involve a 
lo$s of several million pesos to the United States Banking Co. 
trust •••• it is respecttull7 suggested that a positive stand in 
all Mexican matters is advisable, in view of the SerTices we have 
rendered to Mexico and our patience with the Government.49 
At another time he reco_mmended to Washington that Latin Am.erican 
countries should be dealt with "justly and calmly but severely and un-
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deviatingly". To act otherwise, he attirmed, would bring "disaster and 
f'orteitff to the United States, for the people (Mexican) would lose 
the "respect and awe" which they had been taught to give "us". 50 In 
keeping with his idea or taking a "positive stand" and dealing "calm-
ly" with Mexico, the ambassador, in collaboration with the Department 
of' State, sent a strong note to Minister of' Foreign Atf'airs Pedro 
Lascurain, listing several Americans killed in various parts or. the 
country and demanding immediate settlement for a variety o:r claims. 
He concluded with the demand for a 
'8Ji'or. Rel., 1912, p. 826. 
49Ibid., pp. 826.827. 
50:a.mis, .2.E.• ill•, p. 546. 
•• .comprehensive an catagorical statement as to the meas-
ures the llexican GoverIU11ent proposes to adopt ••• to bring about 
such an illlprovement in general conditions throughout :Mexico that 
.American settlers ••• will no longer be subjected to the hard-
ships and outrages attended by a more or less constant state ot 
revolution, lawlessne$s, and ehaos.51 
Though the grievances at this time were really not so great as the 
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ambassador would have them. appear, Minister Lascurain ably answered each, 
referred to similar attacks on Mexican citizens, and indicated willing-
ness to do com.plate justice.52 Be first expressed surprise at the tone 
of the note and then took up the grievances one by one. Of the thirteen 
Americans reported to have been killed in Mexico, tour cases had oc-
curred during the Diaz regime, and judicial investigation had been 
made in ten cases out of which three .men had been sentenced to long 
prison terms and two released for the lack ot evidence. In a third 
case the death of a certain Henry Crumbley was due to a wound receiv-
ed in a tight with a peon over the :tact that Crumbley was making love 
to the peon's wife. Three other Americans who were killed were tili-
bustering, explained Lascurain, and were, engaged in active warfare 
against the government. The remaining cases were under investigation.53 
Therefore, he continued: 
The attitude or the Mexican GoTernment with reference to the 
prosecution and. punishment of persons guilty of viol ence against 
American citizens has been adjusted to the law and it 08.llllOt be 
made the subject tor reproach, except as the result ot eminent-
ly partial and adverse Judgment, which is not in keeping with the 
proofs ot amity previously received and with tb.e course followed 
by the Government -0f the United States with reference to crimes 
eom.'IU.tted within its territory against Mexican citizens. By way 
of an example, I may refer to the following among other cases 
51Joor. Rel., 1912, pp. 842-846. 
52u.:: - -Bemis , _2R,. .ill• , p • 546 • 
53J'or. !.!!_., .ill&, pp. 871-873. 
which could be aeatio:n.ed, to w1 t: Antonio Rodriguez, burnt al1Te 
ill Rocle Springs, on NoT•b•r 9, 1910; Celso OerYantea, .aurdered 
by an Aaer108ll policeman in Loa Angelee • Oalitornia • the .murderer 
haTing bND acquitted; .Daaian Rios and another llexioan, .murdered 
ill '?ens 1D RoTember, 1910; Cruz Rodriguez, ardered. in Del Rio 
b7 an American Cu.awu otticer; The latter •s acquitted because 
it wa• ea.id that the Tictia •• droned in the ~iTer while escap-
ing tro.a hi• pursuers. liioaDor TreTino, .murdered in Ge.lTeaton in 
J'une, 1911; Antonio Goaez, a bo7, lynched in 'lhorndale in NoT•-
ber, 1911. '?he aboTe are a tn ot the 118117 oases which proTe the 
procraatiDation or inditterence of the Aaerican authorities. The 
Mexioans arrMtet at Seguin on August 5 ot this 7ee.r, wounded by 
the oonstablea and sheritts at Marion, Ten•, and placed w1 thout 
aedioal veaaent in a clunpon, where one wa• tound dead on tile 
following da7, proTe the injuatioe ot the iJlputation ot cruelty 
od 1nseas1b111ty on the part of the Mexioan judicial authorities. 
••• I beg w in'tite your attention to the tact that last year only 
'1>.ree Aaericana were Ticti.Jul ot Tioleace, and three aore during the 
present year. 011 U>.e other hand, during the month ot September a-
loll&, of 1910, 1.b.ere nre 'three Aaerioan YiotlU, an.d one in the 
IIIODth of JloT•ber ot the aaae year, prior to the 00.11118Do•8Jlt ot 
the reTolution. lrom the aboYe 1 t can 'be olearly seen ~at out-
rages coJlll1tte4 are those which appear under normal conditions.54 
Den~ing the imputation .that the Mexican goTe?'Dllent was hostile to 
intereau ot the United States, Laacurian '\oolc up one b1 one the clai.Jul 
v.pon wllich Jlr. Wil8on had demanded a "coapreheUiTe" ate.t•ent. The 
Tlahualilo Company, a Bri ti•h cotton-growing orgalli21&'Uon, had brought . 
nit against the goTermaent because it had not rece1Ted a certain 
8JI011llt ot water trom the Kaza.a riTer to irrigate its propert7 and had 
tound court deo1a1oas repeatedly unfaTorable. .ETen the Diaz adm.ni.s-
tration had disputed the coapany's right to the •t•r since thouaa.ncla 
ot aall Jlex1ca.n grown would 'be atteoted adTereely. "file OOllpflJly' • 
claiu, if :not unlawful, were queatione.ble.S!S 
As tor tile 'faapico oil companies which the ambassador claiaed 
were taxed "out of anti-Aaerican aentiaent ... , senor Lascurain pointed 
out that the tax 8.liounted to one and one-l:t.alt cents per barrel and 
5'Ib1d., P• 8"13. 
55fbicl., P• 8'15. -
could scarcely be considered exorbitant mum the tax on oil in Cali-
fornia was tar .more. Besides, he argued, the · same tax had bun levied 
on ~lish and Mexican oil interests as well and had been accepted 
w1 thout discussion. Under Diaz the owners ot the great oil interests 
had paid no tax at all. Under Madero the OOllpaniea had entered 1n~o 
several convacts which ex•pted th• from all taxation except the one 
paid b7 revenue ataaps, and age.inst this one the aa'baaaador had ol)-
jected. 56 
'l'he llexic8.ll Harald. which Mr. · Wilson oonsidered .as "persecuted", 
had tormerl7 reoe1Ted a subsidy- troa the Diaz goTernment, and because 
the Jladero adainiatJ;"ation had :refwled to do li.k8111ae, it had beooae 
violently hostile to the president'• policies, ZLOt onl7 editorially 
but by aeans ot a terrific campaign la which talae reports had been 
published to ca.use alara througb.out Mexico. 'l'b.e gonrue:nt, therefor•, 
suppressed one issue ot a "foreign aarcantile conoen, which specu-
lated w1 th the peace ot the coutry", this particu~r issue having 
81ll\ounced a disastrous deteat of the governaent toroea b7 Orosco. 
After the single lane had been auppreaae4, the ·41.reotore ot 'the 
journal took advantage ot th• opportunity- to suspend i w tu tun publica-
tion beeaus• it had not bHa yielding proti ta. They then pressed the 
governa•t tor suppoeecl lo•••• eyen \hough they w•i-• at liberty to 
continue 1"8 publication. '1'11• atter of 1ille Asaociatecl Presa waa 
only a 41••gre911.9nt between the press aaeoaiation and the gQTernaent 
over ter• ot a contract. Actually the ambaaaacloJ> 11a4 att•pted to 
56Ib1d. -
convert the defunct Herald into an American "right".57 
The complaint or the ambassador concerning a lockout of American 
employees on the railways was answered With the info.r.mation that the 
said lockout was nothing more than a walk-out on the part of American 
workers, after the government had decreed the use of the Spanish lan-
guage in train orders. Such action was a part of Madero's general 
policy to Mexicanize railways and was, it is true, a distinct reaction 
against the partiality shown by the Diaz regime to a minority of 
Americans over a majority or Mexican employees. Thus, it was evident 
that the pendulum was swinging the other way. But a sillilar policy 
by a stronger nation might have been accepted without diplomatic 
pressure being exerted.59 
Another claim which Mr. Wilson pressed amounted to 3,000,000 for 
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Chinese murdered at Torreon. The fact that one ot his close associates, 
Judge Wilfley, was counsel for the case creates the impression that the 
ambassador's interest was not altogether hUDlanitarian.59 
Thus, with the close ot the year 1912, the American 0J11.bassador had 
become distinctly hostile to the lla.dero government as evidenced by his 
alarmistio notes to Washington and by the dubious, but trequent, claims 
pressed upon the Mexican goverD.llent. Such evidence will assume the 
nature or an indictment against Mr. Wilson's conduct, atter it is shown 
in the following chapters that he vigorously supported the Huerta regime 
which came into power through the use of treachery and murder and proved 
57Ibid., p. 874. 
58Jbid., pp. 910-924. 
59oruening, .2£.• ill•, p. 566. 
itself incapable of preserving; order in IJexico equal to that not 
preserved by the ::Jiadero administration. 
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Chapter IV. Ambassador Wilson and the Coup d'Etat, 
February, 1913. 
With the coming of the year 1915, Mr. Wilson's opposition to the 
l4adero government became magnified to the point t~at he supplemented 
his more passive role of complaining through tile .use ot distorted and 
alarming diplODlB.tic notes with active participation in a coup d'etat 
which overthrew the Maderist regime and cost the lives ot both the 
president and vice-president by treacherous assassination. 
As early as January 7, 1913, the ambassador wired Washington that 
the situation was "gloomy if not hopeless".l And a week later, he re-
ported that the Madero government was planning a sham revolutionary 
44 
uprising in order to kill Felix Diaz and his companions in prison, "11.nd 
to .1118.ke it appear that they were killed accidentally, or to be justified 
in shooting them immediately afterwards". He urged sending a warship.2 
It may be stated here that action or this nature on the part of Madero 
was completely out of harmony with his policy of forgiveness and amnesty. 
As a matter of tact, Felix Diaz, at the time of the ambassadorial note, 
had been imprisoned, instead of being shot, because of the presi dent's 
lenieney. 'lhis "stocky and swarthy" nephew of former President Diaz 
had rebelled at Vera Cruz where an attractive customshouse was located, 
but failing to receive the entire support of the federal battalions as 
he had expected, he was captured by government forces, tried, and con-
victed of treason. By the practice or civilized nation and certainly 
lFor. Rel., 1913, p. 692. 
2---- ---- ......_, .ill!·, p. 693. 
by Mexican precede~t he should have been summarily shot, but Jladero 
interceded to save his life and allowed his transfer to the citadel, 
an arsenal and prison, in Mexico City.3 
This act of clemency by the president proTed to be the undoing of 
his government, for at the prison Felix Diaz met senor Bernardo Reyes, 
pompous general whom President Diaz had "shipped" to Europe because 
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of his presidential aspirations, and who, upon hearing of the Revolution, 
hurried back to crush it. On reaching Havana, however, he heard of its 
progress and offered his services instead through a pledge of loyalty to 
Madero. Four months later he revolted when his prospects for the presi-
deney proved unproraj.sing. The rebellion was easily squelched and the 
general was imprisoned in Mexico City and treated with all courtesy.4 
The prisons, now housing two arch enemies of tha government, be-
came the center of plans for its overthrow. Felix Diaz, Reyes, and 
several other prominent members of the military clique who were bitter 
over the loss of perquisites enjoyed under Porfirio Diaz conspired to 
depose the government and set themselves up in its place with Reyes as 
provisional president to be succeeded by Felix Diaz. while other mem-
bers were to receive lucrative positions in the cabinet or army. 
General Victoriano Huerta was included in the plans but with less 
certainty.5 
3Gruening, .21?.• ill•, pp . 303,566; "Seven Days of Felix Diaz", 
Literary Digest, XLV (November 2, 1912), 774,775; William Carol, "The 
North and South War in Mexico", World's Work, XXVII, (January, 1914), 
298-306. ----
4Gruening, .2£.• .ill·, pp. 302,303; Butterfield, "Situation in 
Mexico", North American Review, CXCVII, {November, 1912), 465. 
5Gruening, .s?R.• ill•, pp. 303,304. 
On the night ot February 8, 1913, a group of cadets from the m111-
tary college, in connivance with small bodies of disloyal troops, moved 
into the city and released Reyes and Diaz. The next morning, with the 
seizure of the arsenal, the rebels paraded into the great plaza in 
front of the National Palace and began the at\ack known as the tragic 
ten days. According to well-laid plans of the conspirators, the com-
mander of the National Palace guard had been won over and was to sub-
mit at the beginning ot the assualt, but due to the eloquence of 
Gustavo Madero, the president's brother, members of the guard were 
persuaded to remain true and the defense was turned over to ~e loyal 
and taithtul General Villar. Consequently, when the rebels advanced, 
instead ot a welcome, they received a volley and General Reyes tell 
dead. His men returned the fire, and then retreated to the citadel 
atter the palace ma.chine-guns began to sweep the square. Two hours 
later President Madero rode do11n on horseback from his residence in 
Chapultepec and serenly entered the palace.6 
The attempt to depose the president was a ttcomplete fizzle", and 
without the treachery ot General Huerta, &Jtively aided and encouraged 
by Ambassador Wilson, the coup would very likely have died at an early 
date. 7 
In the volley trom the rebels, a bullet had shattered General 
Villar's collar bone, compelling his retirement. General Huerta, whom 
Madero had used against Orozco, was called to the palace and given 
charge of its defense and of the campaign to put down the rebellion. 
6lbid., pp. 304,305; Bell,~· .2.!.l•, 272-275. 
7Ib1d., pp. 304,566. -
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Meanwhile, in a secret conference, Huerta and Diaz had laid a new scheme 
ror the president's downfall so that when Huerta assumed control of the 
army a "sham warfare" ensued. With tour-fifths of the army loyal aud 
with a f'orc that outnumbered that ot the rebels tour to one, Buerta 
easily could ha Ye suppressed the reTolt. Instead he rode daily with 
Madero as his friend but conducted attacks against the rebels so as 
to insure failure. For example, he hurried cavalry by train from tar-
away places and rushed the exhausted columns, mounted on halt-starved 
horses, over slippery pavement to attack the three-story citadel armed 
with lll8chine guns; he carefully aimed artillery so that shells tell 
on business sections or the city instead ot on the rebel arsenal; and 
he kept up desultory :fighting tor ten days With great destruction of 
parts of the City, merely to create a picture of a oivil war which, 
Madero not being able to put it down. would necessitate the serYiee ot 
the treacherous generals.8· 
On l!'ebruary 10, one day after the first sham attack, Ambassador 
Wilson wired the state department tat practically all the local state 
authorities. police, and rurales had revolted to Diaz.9 Bu.t according 
to another source, the eniire rebellious force consisted of' eight hun-
dred men, three batteries of' the artillery, and the palace guard.l.0 
On the day ot the tirst assault (February 9), Wilson reported that 
Felix Diaz sent an emissary to ask the ambassador to urge Madero to 
47 
SGruening, .fil9.•, pp. 304,305; "The True Story ot Madero' s Death", 
Forwn, (September, 1916), 257-267. 
9ror. Rel., (1913}, p. 701. 
lem:::"'. - -Gruening, .21?..• ill•, p. 566. 
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resign in order to avoid wmecessary bloodshed. Mr. Wilson explained 
that he refused to act until the man went away and returned with proper 
credentials. He then oalled together the diplomatic corp which delegated 
him to make demands of the minister of foreign affeirs.11 
On February ll he notified the department that public opinion, both 
native and foreign, as tar as he could estimate, seemed to be over-
whelmingly in favor of Diaz.12 A tew hours later he wired askillS that 
the government of the United Sta.tea em.power him with "firm, drastic 
instruction, perhaps of a menacing character", or that he be given 
general powers in the name of the president.13 However, on the follow-
1ng day Secretary Knox replied that the president was not convinced "ot 
the advisability of any such instructions at the present time".14 
On the same day at 2: 00. P. M. , he explained that he had been 
informally notified by Diaz that he would expect the United States 
immediately to recognize his belligerency, it the rebels were success-
ful in battle that day.15 Still later, Mr. Wilson reported that he 
had gone to protest to the president against continuance of hostil-
ities and found Madero visibly embarassed. He then visited Diaz who 
received him "with all honors of war". Mr. Wilson noted that the 
morale of the rebel troops was exeellent.16 
T.b.ree days later on the night of February 14, Ambassador Wilson 
sent for the British, German, 8.Jld Spanish Jdinisters to come to the 
llFor. Rel., 1913, p. 700. 
1~- -Ibid., p. '702. 
13lbid., p. 704. 
lA-::--·l.bid., p. 706. 
l5fb1d., :p. 703. 
l6Ibid., p. 706, 707. 
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Embassy "to con.sider the situation and resolve upon same actionw. After 
a conference lasting from one o'clock 1n the morning until nearly three, 
it was decided to ask, "even without instructions", that President Madero 
immediately resign. The Spanish minister, designated to bear this view 
to the president, called the next morning upon Madero Who refused to 
resign and maintained that diplomats had no right to interfere With 
domestic questions of Mexico. He further affirmed that as legally 
elected constitutional president, he would die in defense or his rights.17 
The next day the American ambassador went alone to confer with Huerta 
atter an exchange of courteous notes had been made.18 Two days later 
Mr. Wilson wired that Huerta notified him to expect some action that 
would remove lladero from power at an7 moment.19 
From Februarr 10 to February 18, the Mexican President was urged 
to resign first by the diplomatic corps led by Mr. Wilson and then by 
lukewarm po-11ticians and wealthy Mexicans. Be consistently retused 
and argued that such action would put a premium on tuture rebellions 
and would .make the presidency a prize to any adventurer. lie turther 
maintained that his resignation would mean desertion of the masses who 
made him the legal, constitutional ruler of his country. In this case, 
it is pertinent to a study of this sort to note that those requesting 
the president's resignation for the "peace" of Mexico forgot to urge 
Diaz to cease his bombardment tor the same purpose.20 
l7Ibid., p. 712. 
18ibid., pp. 712,713. 
l9Ibid., p. 718. 
20"True Storr ot Madero's Death", loo. cit., p. 286; Butterfield, 
"The Conspiracy against Madero", 12£• cit., pp." 474,475. 
'l'.b.e eleven-day bombardment ' enabled Huerta to lay his plane so 
that he, instead or Felix Diaz, would become president. On February 18 
one of his generals entered the palace and arrested Madero and Vice-
President Pino Suarez. 'l'.b.ey were then confined as prisoners, under 
heaTy guard, in the palace. On the saa• day, Huerta, while lunching 
with Gustavo Madero, borrowed his pistol and left the restaurant. After 
a short time, he returned with soldiers and arrested GustaTO. '.the next 
night, Huerta turned the president's unfortunate brother over to a 
group of drunken officers who brutally murdered their victim. With 
the news of the arrests, both armies ceased firing. Thus, the coup had 
been effected.21 
Huerta invited Diaz to the palace as soon as the arrests were made, 
but when these two conspirators were unable to agree on a meeting place 
because or their distrust of one another, Ambassador Wilson invited 
them to the Embassy where a conference, which lasted well into the morn-
ing, ensued.22 Previous to this meeting, however, Mr. Wilson had wired 
the department ot state that he understood the federal generals had 
taken control o:f the situation. As orginally planned, the eoup was to 
take place at noon but an unexpected delay held it otf until 1:30 P. M. 
In his note to ash1ngton 1 the ambassador had reported the occurrence 
of an event one and one-half hours before it actually happened.23 
In describing the role played by :vr. Wilson during the coup dtetat, 
Protessor Herbert I. Priestly wrote: 
2llb1d.; Gruening, .2E.• ill•, p. 305. 
22fili. 
23oruen1ng, .ER.• ill•, p. 567. 
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.Henry Lane Wilson was inimical to Madero throughout the Tragic 
Ten Days. 'lhe Embassy was the center or anti-government activity. 
Huerta and Diaz visited him there on the night or February 18, and 
talked with him concerning their pact for the division of the govern-
mental powers they had seized. There the names or the prospective 
ministers were discussed and agreed upon. Wilson then sub.mitted 
them to foreign ministers, who were waiting in an adjoining room, 
and asked their comments, in case any appointments seemed inappropri-
ate. The ministers merely took note of them but made no comment. 
'!hey then listened while Rodolfo Reyes {son ot General Reyes and a 
capable attorney who had ably supported his father's a11.bitions for 
the presidency) read to them what is popularly known as the "Pact 
ot C1udadela" • .Huerta and Diaz shortly thereafter left, singly. 
The members of the Corps, on taking their farewells, expressed 
solicitude tor the lives of the executives. J4r. Wilson seemed not 
deeply moved. His associates noted that he had felt tree to lend 
his influence to the destruction of a legitimate government and to 
listen to the pla.ns of the usurping factions, but when it came to 
proposals to save the lives of the prisoners, he had no plans nor 
even suggestions to offer.24 
Marquez Sterling, the Cuban Minister, explained that on the very 
night (February 18) that treason had overthrown the government, Huerta 
and Diaz met at the American Embassy and under the aegis ot llr. Wilson 
drew up the so-called "Compact or the Citadel", since known in Mexico 
as the "Compact or the Embassy". To the diplomatic corps, which was 
assembled at the invitation or its dean, the American ambassador, Mr. 
Wilson declared that Mexico had been saved and that from now on there 
would be peace, progress, and prosperity. And then he stated that he 
had known about the plans to imprison ~dero tor three days and that it 
had been to occur that morning.25 
Next the ambassador announced the exact composition ot Huerta's 
cabinet. //hen the compact was read aloud, he lead the applause, and 
as Felix Diaz entered, he cried out "Long live General Diaz, Saviour 
24Priestly, .21?.• ill•, pp. 395, 415. 
2fiua.rquez Sterling, Los Ultimas Dias Del Presidente Madero, pp. 
471, 472. Q.uoted by Gruening, .2.2.• cit., p~8. 
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of Mexico!" All present were invited to tb.e butfet to drink champagne. 
Attar Huerta and Diaz had been ceremoniously ushered out. one of the 
diplomats inquired as to the fate of Madero, and the American Ambassador 
replied that they would put Madero in a madhouse, where he should al-
ways be kept. As for Pino Suarez, he was nothing but a scoundrel. If' 
they killed him it would be no great loss. In reply to the Chilean 
minister's state11ent that the prisoners should not be harmed, Mr. 
Wilson aftirmed that the diplomats "must not meddle in the domestic 
affairs of Mexico". Nothing further was spoken as the ministers 
passed ~1etly trom the Embassy.26 Later, one of them commented: 
This Ambassador does not refuse to allow a rebel chief' under 
the roof of his goTernment to plot the downtall ot the legitimate 
goverruaent to which he is accredited. He is a willing Witness to 
the compact; he even discusses the persons who will form the new 
government without a thought as to whether or not the matter deals 
purely with the domestic affairs of the country; but when the ques-
tion turns to the saving of the liTes of two officials whoa treason 
and infamy are perhaps even now discussing the manner of killing, 
he finds his position as representative of a foreign power does not 
allow him to intervene.27 
The Cuban minister expressed the Ambassador's responsibility in 
these words: 
Mr. Wilson has said since that "the Embassy converted itself 
into the center of all activities in favor of humanity".• But in 
all truth, as I saw it, then e.nd later, with the testi.lllony or the 
Spanish Minister, Senor Oologan, and the numerous proofs which had 
been accumulating since, the embassy was not other than a center of 
true conspiracy against the government •••• Not the revolt of the 
Citadel, but the conspiracy of the embassy, had triumphed.28 
26Ibid. 
27Ramon Prida, De la Diotadura a' l!_ Anarquia, II, 547,548. 
Q.uoted by Gruening, ~.cit., P• 568. 
28Jla.rquez Sterling,~. ill•, pp. 391, 379, 380. Quoted by 
Gruening, .21?.• ill•, p. 567. 
A trained and unbiased observer, Edward I. Bell, who was perhaps 
better informed on what happened than any other America.n,29 had this to 
say of the ambassador's influence on the Madero government: 
Knowing as I do how narrowly Madero missed a triumph over the 
extraordinary difficulties and deadly enemies that beset him., I am 
constrained to believe that the least value which can be assigned 
to the unfortunate influence ot the American .Ambassador is still 
sufficient to have turned the sca.le.30 
From the tall or the Madero government until the death of its 
form.er chief executive four days later, Ur. Wilson abruptly changed 
his policy of interterenee in the overthrow of the existing government 
to one of non-interference in the affairs of the usurpers to save the 
lives of the deposed officials. On February 19, the same day on which 
the tront pages or Mexico City's newspapers were eovered with news ot 
Gustavo 11.adero's murder, he reported to Washington: 
I went to see General Huerta this afternoon to get guarantees 
of public order and to learn the exact situation. He gave me satis-
factory assurances and explained that Gustavo Madero had been mur-
dered, without orders. General Huerta said that the President and 
Gustavo Madero had twice tried to assassinate him and had held him 
a prisoner for one day. He asked my advice as to whether it was 
best to send the ex-President out of the country or place him in a 
lunatic asylum. I replied that he ought to do that which 1s best 
for the peace of the country.31 
This interview with Huerta is conspicuous tor its absence of a 
single word concerning the safety of the prisoners. The ambassador 
had tailed to add any caution that "soldiers without orders" might also 
murder Francisco Madero. Instead, the next day, February 20, he wired 
that a ffwicked despotism" had fallen. Within two more hours he again 
29Gruening, on. cit., pp. 304, 368. 
3n... .;;... --Dell, on. cit., p. 416. 
31 ..... -For. Rel., 1913, p. 724. -- -
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telegraphed, this 1ime requesting the department to instruct "immedi-
ately" as to recognition or the provisional government , "now installed 
and evidently in secure position." He furth6r added that it would be 
well to note that the provisional government took ottice in accordance 
with the constitution and precedents. An hour later he wired the text 
of the resignation which had been forced upon Madero and Suarez.32 
The "constituttonal means" by which Huerta came to power were 
arranged at the American Embassy on the night of February 18. Accord-
ing to the "Compact of the 01 tadel" every ettort was to be made "under 
the best legal conditions" tor Huerta to assume the presidency within 
sev8l'lty-two hours. This objective was accomplished by wringing resig-
nations from Madero and Suarez, thereby permitting the presidency to 
tall, according to the constitution, upon Foreign Minister Pedro 
Lascurain who in turn appointed Huerta to the ministry and then resigned, 
leaving Huerta in power. 'lllus, Huerta we.s proclaimed provisional presi-
dent on February 21. Before tendering the resignations, however, Senor 
Lascurain asked tor ettective guarantees ot the prisoners' lives. To 
the request, Huerta swore upon a medal or the Virgin of Guadalupe, which 
had belonged to his mother, that no attempt would be made against the 
life of Ma.dero.33 
Meanwhile , at Washington, the department cf state he.d sensed the 
ambassador 's responsibility. One day after Mr. ilson reported his 
visit to General Huerta, Secretary Knox Wired: 
.!2.2.• 
pp. 724, 725. 
p. 722; Butterfield, "The Conspiracy against Madero", 
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••• General Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of 
Madero tends to give you a certain responsibility in the matter. It 
moreover goes without saying that cruel treatment of the ex-President 
would injure••• the reputation of Mexican civilization, and this 
government earnestly ••• hopes to hear that he has been dealt with 
in a manner consistent with peace and humanity •••• You may in your 
discretion make use of these ideas in your conversation With General 
Huerta.34 
In a second message the next day, February 21, the secretary in-
formed Mr. Wilson that the shooting of Gustavo .Madero had caused a most 
unfavorable impression in Washington and that the president was grati-
tied to believe that there was no prospect of injury to the deposed 
president or vice-president or their families. 35 
Two days before the ambassador received these maesages trom Wash-
ington, several efforts were made in Mexico to induce him to intercede 
in behalf of the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez. On February 19, one 
day after Gustavo Madero's murder, the Cuban minister wrote Mr. Wilson 
a note, warning him. of the danger, and offered the use of the Cuban ship 
~ at Vera Cruz to take away the prisoners. Both the tather and 
mother of Madero wrote to the diplomatic corps_, of which M:r. Wilson was 
dean by virtue oi' his being the only ambassador accredited to Mexico, 
requesting aid to save the lite of their son.36 
Finally Ka.dero's wife called upon the ambassador and begged him 
to send a letter, which Madero' s mother had written, to President Taft . 
About three and one-halt years after this visit, Mrs. Madero related 
her experience with the ambassador, in an interview, to Robert .Hammond 
34ror. Rel., 1913, P• 725. 
3~- -Ibid., p. 726. 
36oruening, ~· ill•, p. 570. 
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Murray, a Mexico correspondent of the New York World during the Huerta 
and Madero regimes. During the World War this same correspondent headed 
the United States Co.mmittee on Public Information in Mexico City. The 
interview with 14rs. Ka.dero took place, August 15, 1916, and was later 
presented to her tor approval. On April 29, 1927, she swore to its 
correctness before the vice-consul of the United States in Maxico. The 
interview was first used by Ernest Gruening in his U.Xico ~~Heritage 
through the courtesy of Mr. Murray, who holds a copy•right on the fol-
lowing account of Mrs. Kadero's interview with the ambassador. 
Q,. When did you have your interview with the Anlbassador? 
A. That afternoon, February 20, 1913. Mercedes, my sister-in-law, 
was with me. The Ambassador was not in when we entered the 
Embassy. llrs. Wilson received us, and caused a telephone mes-
sage to be sent to the Palace (he was with Huerta at the National 
Palace) notifying the Ambassador that we were there. 
Q. What was the manner and appearance ot the Ambassador? 
A •••• Ris manner was brusque. At times Mrs. Wilson tugged at his 
coat, apparently to try to induce him to speak differently. It 
was a painful interview. I told the Ambassador that we had co.111.e 
to seek protection tor the lives of the President and the Vice 
President. "Very well, lladam", said he, "What is it you want me 
to do?" "I want you to use your influence to protect the liTes 
ot .my husband and the other prisoners." 
"That is a responsibility that I do not care to undertake, either 
tor .myself, or my government", replied the Ambassador. 
"Will you be good enough then", I asked, "to send this telegram 
to President Tatt?" 
I handed him a message addressed to President Tatt, which had 
been written by the President's mother and signed by her. It 
was through the .Ambassador that our only hope lay in obtaining 
OOJIIIIIUllication with President Tatt. We supposed that the cable 
was in the hands of the government (the Huerta government) and 
that it was useless to expect that a message of this sort would 
be allowed to pass. 
Q.. What was the reply of the Ambassador to your request, a:t.'ter he 
had read the message? 
A. "It is not necessary to send this," he said. But I persisted. 
"All right", promised the Ambassador. "I shall send it." He 
put the message in his pocket. 
~. What followed after you had deliTered to the Ambassador the 
message directed to President Tatt? 
A. The .Ambassador said: "I will be frank with you, Ma.dam. Your 
husband's down.tall is due to the :faot that he never wanted to 
consult with me." I could reply nothing to this, :for I had gone 
there to ask a faTor, to plead for my husband's lite, not to dis-
cuss questions o:f polities, or policies with the .Ambassador. 
Q.. What else did the Ambassador say? 
A. The Ambassador continued: "You know~ Madam., your husband had 
peculiar ideas." I said: "Mr. Ambassador, my husband had not 
peculiar ideas, but high ideals." To this the Ambassador did not 
reply, and I proceeded to say that I asked the same protection 
and assurance for the lite ot Vice-President Pino Suarez, as I 
asked tor President Madero. The Ambassador's manner grew Tery 
impatient. "Pino Suarez is a very bad man", he said, "I cannot 
give any assurance for his safety. He is to blame for most ot 
your husband's troubles. That kind of man must disappear. •••" 
Q. What did the Ambassador mean by saying that Vice-President Pino 
Suarez "must disappear"? 
A. I interred that the Ambassador meant that the Vice-President's 
life must be sacreticed. I then represented to him that Mr. Pino 
Suarez had a wife and six children who would be left in poverty 
in the event or his death. 
Q.. What did he say to that? 
A. He merely shrugged his shoulders. He told me that General Huerta 
had asked him what should be done with the prisoners. "What did 
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you tell General Huerta?"' I asked. "I told him that he must do 
what was best tor the interests or the country", said the Ambassador. 
Here my sister-in ... law interrupted and said: "Why did you say that? 
You know very well what kind o:r men Huerta and his people are, and 
that they are going to kill them:" · 
~. What did the Ambassador say? 
A. Re made no response, but turned to me and said: "You know that 
your husband is unpopular; that the people were not satisfied 
with him as President".· I asked, "Why, then, if this is true, is 
he not perm1tte4 to go tree and proceed to Europe, where he could 
do no harm"? The Ambassador replied, "You need not worry; the 
person of your husband will not be harmed. I knew all along that 
this was going to happen. That is why I suggested that your hus-
band should resign". "But if' you knew or this in advanctt, Mr. 
Ambassador", I asked him, "Why did you not warn my husband"? 
"Oh, no", replied the Ambassador, "that would not have been good 
policy, because then he would have prevented it". 
Q. The Ambassador is quoted in an interTiew in the New York Herald 
on March 21, 1916, as saying that you had requested him to ask 
Huerta to "Put your husband in the penitentiary tor sate-keeping". 
Did you make such a request of the Ambassador? 
A. No. We di~cussed only the personal satety and the urgency of 
Huerta being compelled to keep his promise to allow the President 
and the other prisoner to leave '\he country. "He seems to be 
getting along all right", said the Ambassador, "he has slept tor 
:tiYe hours without waking". 
Q. What was the outcome of the conversation? 
A. When the interview was terminated and we went away, we had gained 
nothing excepting the Ambassador's assurance that the President 
would not sutfer bodily harm and his promise to send the message 
soliciting the intervention of President Taft to save the lives 
ot the prisoners. 
~. Was the Ambassador's assurance carried out? 
A. 'l'wo days later the prisoners were assassinated. 
Q. Did you converse with the Ambassador in Spanish or in English? 
A. In English. 
Q. Is it your opinion that the lives of the President and the Vice-
President could have been saved by the Ambassador? 
A. It is my belief that had properly energetic representations been 
.made by the .Ambassador which it was reaso?18ble to expect him to 
make, in the interest o t hume.ni ty, not only would the 11 ves ot 
the President and the Vice-President been spared, but a respon-
sibility would have been averted trom the United States which 
was thru.st upon it by the acts ot its then diplomatic representa-
tive.37 
A Short time before midnight, Febru.ary 22, the prisoners were 
taken from the palace and informed that they were being moved to the 
penitentiary tor greater oomrort. As they entered the automobiles 
tor their removal, it is said that an eye witness heard Madero remark: 
"Comrade, this is the endn. When the cars reached the rear of the peni-
tentiary, the prisoners were asked to step out, and, as they did so, 
revolvers were placed near their heads and their brains blown out. 
Immediately after the murders, a group of men, stationed at the door-
way of the prison, fired several shots in the air to .IIIElke it appear 
that a skirmish had ensued. The leader of this group was a certain 
Cecilio Ocon who had participated in the murder of Gustavo lle.dero.38 
As its official account to the papers the next morning, the .Huerta 
government stated that, as the prisoners were transferred to the peni-
37tbid., PP• 570-573. 
38.Bu't"tertield, "The Conspiracy .Against Maderon, loo. cit., pp. 
464-482; "True Story ot Madero's Deathn, ~. ill•• F- 2aE:'2a9; 
Gruening, .21?.• .ill•, p. 573. 
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tentiary for greater comfort, an attempt was made to rescue them and 
they both were killed accidentally in the cross tire. This version, 
immediately accepted by Ambassador Wilson and relayed to Washington, 
did not hold up under inspection.59 
In the first place, the fact that belollgings of the prisoners 
remained at the palace did not indicate that they were to stay at the 
penitentiary tor a great length ot tillle. Secondly, it seemed strange 
that no member ot the prisoners' escort was hurt by the would-be res-
cuers, but yet these friends of Madero riddled with bullets the men 
they were trying to rescue. Furthermore, the escort, in returning the 
fire, hit none ot the assailants. It is true that after suspicion was 
aroused in llexico City, a report went out that five assailants had also 
been killed, but the names or these individuals were never discovered 
nor were any corpses found.40 
Motivated by the tact that Mexico City was shocked by the horror 
ot the crime, especially in view ot the leniency that dero had shown 
to rebels against his government, Ruerta conducted a "rigorous investi-
gation". But later, a certain Cardenas, who arrived at the prison with 
the dead bodies, was promoted along with the doctor who performed the 
autopsy. With the victory of the Constitutionalists 1n 1915, Cardenas 
fled to Guatemala where he made a tull confession of the crime and ad-
mitted being the otticer who personally killed Madero. His confession 
was published in !:!_Nacion, Havana, April 24, 1916. It has been stated 
39J'or. Rel., 1913, p. 732. 
'°Gruen"i'iii, 2.1!.• ai t., p. 573; :Butterfield, "The Conspiracy against 
Madero", .!2£.• ill•, pp. 464-482. 
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that eye witnesses followed the cars from the pala.ee end saw the dead 
bodies and that Madero was not recognizable except for his beard. Other 
reports were that the former president's hair was singed while the body 
ot Suarez showed signs ot strangulation.41 
'lhe day after the murders, before it was reasonable to believe that 
the truth was known in the case, Mr. Wilson telegraphed the government's 
Tersion to the department of state, and on the day following , February 
24, again wired: 
The tragedy of yesterday evidently produced no effect upon the 
public mind. The city remains perfectly quiet and unofficial tele-
grams indicate the same situation throughout the Republic, with few 
exceptions •••• It is quite evident that the people hail with satis-
faction the present regime.42 
According to the evid8llce given out by other sources, Mr. Wilson's 
report of conditions after the tragedy lfflS not true. The Spanish minis-
ter wrote that the version ot an attempted rescue found no acceptance 
outside of government circles.43 Dolores Butterfield, who spent seven-
teen years in Mexico and s 1n the republic at the time of the assassi-
nationa, wrote that .Madero's murder brought a reaction to the extent 
that people gathered in the streets and wept, even under the terrorizing 
guns ot Huerta nd Di z. Outside the capital, she reported that the 
country lia.S aflame and civil war embraced Mexico. Fourteen states out 
or the twenty-seven were soon in open rebellion.44 
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Wil.liam Carol, writing for the World's _-2£!£ magazine, made a similar 
41Ibid. 
42ior': Rel., 1913, p. 732. 
~:rnardo J' .-;re-cologan, ~ ~ Verdad, Q.uoted by Gruening , op. 
ill·, .J· 573. 
2• .ill· t pp. 464-482. 
report. Both Zapata in the South and Vasquez Gomez in the North con-
tinued in revolt, he said, and in the North, "the people as a whole saw 
in the assassinations cold-blooded murder of their political idol at 
61 
the hands of unscrupulous money interests and of old Porfirian adherents.ft45 
Mr. Wilson might have been misinformed as to conditions so soon after 
the murders, and could have been pardoned for his error had he not con-
tinued to falsity his reports in order to secure United States recog-
nition or the Huerta government. He urged recognition in spite of the 
tacts that order was not preserved by the new regime and that recog-
nition was contrary to the will ot his government at Washington. 
45r..oc. ill•, pp. 298-306. 
Chapter V. Ambassador Wilson and the Huerta 
Government. 
From the day of the coup d'eta t in Mexico until he was recalled 
by the incoming Wilson administration at Washington, the American 
ambassador vigorously worked to secure recognition or the Huerta re-
gime by the United States goTernment. ETen after his dismissal, he 
continued to urge support of the usurping powers and publicly attacked 
President ilson's Mexican policy, which was in direct opposition to 
that of the ambassador. 
After notifying the department of state that the Huerta govern-
ment was "now installed and eviden.tly in secure position,"l the 
American ambassador sent, on February 21, the following message to 
his consuls: 
Provisional government installed yesterday with General Huerta 
as president. General public approval of congress in this city, 
which is perfectly quiet; reassuring reports come from other 
places. President Madero is a prisoner awaiting the decision of 
Congress in his case. Senate and Chamber of Deputies in tull ac-
cord with new administration. You should make this intelligence 
public, and in the interest of Mexico, urge general submission 
and adhesion to the new Government, which will be recognized by 
all foreign governments to-day.2 
By requesting his consuls to engage actively in texican political 
affairs by "urging submission and adhesion» to the provisional govern-
ment, Mr . Wilson encouraged the same type of action - that of inter-
fering in the domestic affairs of another nation - against which he 
had objected when a ember ot the diplomatic corps showed concern tor 
lFor. Rel., 1913, p. 725. 
2'i'i:7': - -ill!• , P• 732. 
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the lite ot Madero. Also, he appeared to have established a new 
precedent of official interference in the affairs of another nation. 
Moreover, his statements that Congress was in full accord with the 
new administration and that it would be recognized by all foreign 
governments "to-day" were talse.3 
Soon after the assassinations, the ambassador tried to thrust 
aside the incidents as ot little consequence to the world and tele-
graphed the department ot state that he was disposed to accept the 
government's version of the affair and consider it a closed incident 
and that cooperation of the department 1n that direction would be of 
infinite value.4 The next day February 25, he wired that the Associated 
Press announcement that the British government would refrain trom 
recognizing the present, legally constituted provisional goTernment 
had made a disagreeable impression on the Mexican government. He 
then urged the secretary of state to accept a statement which he had 
drawn up, implying that recognition was not far off, so that action 
from the United States government would not produce a "depressing 
effect" as had the utterance trom the British. 'Ihe ambassador's 
statem.ent was written in the manner of a pledge to the provisional 
government that the United States would base its conclusions on recog-
nition "wholly trom the reports of its consular officers in Mexico and 
of the Embassy in Mexico crity."5 
This note, requesting that Washington rely wholly upon consular 
3oruening, ££• cit., p. 574. 
4ror. Rel., l9l~p. 736. 
5™"'. - -Ibid., p. 738. -
and am.bassadorial reports i'or its action in the He:xican situation 
clarified the reason why Mr. Wilson ordered his consuls to urge "sub-
mission and adhesion" to the Huerta regime to the extent that he 
:falsif'ied his reports to them. The Ta.ft administration, however, re-
tused to act us hastily as the ambassador wished. The department of 
state informed him that for the present no formal recognition would be 
accorded those de facto in control and that he should take no action 
in the matter, except upon specific instructions from the department 
to do so. 0 
Recognizing the attitude of' the American newspapers, Secretary 
F21ox further explained that "practical unanim.i ty1' of the American 
press considered as inadequate the explanations made by the Huerta 
regime in regard. to the death of 1:Iade:ro and Suarez. The secretary 
then wrote that those responsible for the "horrible occurrence« could 
not expect to escape public suspicion and that the United States gov-
ernmen-'l> was obliged to express itself on the "painful subject pending 
the promised thorough inveatigationn.? 
Meanwhile, before Mr. Wilson recei'ved this expression from the 
department of state, he had again, more vigouously this time, insisted 
that the consuls use their influence in behalf ot the provisional gov-
eminent. On :i'ebruary 26, he wired all consuls in Mexico to e2.~ert them-
selves "without ceasing to bring about the general submissionfl to the 
Huerta regime and to nmove actively in this matter'', since the new 
6Ibid., p. 747. 
'/Ibid. 
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government was "generally adhered to throughout the republic" and was 
showing "great firmness and activity".a 
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A form.er member of President Woodrow Wilson's cabinet has said that 
the aJllbassador•s dispatches were evidence that he pursued the extra-
ordinary course o:r seeking to win submission within llexico to the Huerta 
administration so that it might on the strength of its effectiveness 
comm.and the good Will of the incoming president. 9 At least. his efforts 
to secure recognition increased as President Wilson's inauguration drew 
near. On Us.rch 1, he wired that Governor Carranza or Coahuila had sub-
mitted unconditionally, and after listing other submissions, concluded 
that it looked as if adhesion to the provisional government would be 
general.lo On the day after President Wilson's inauguration. the am-
bassador informed the new secretary or state, Mr. Bryan, that the states 
which had submitted included 90 percent of the people of llexico and that 
order had been established over three-fourths of the territory th97 repre-
sented.11 
But reports from .American consular officers in Mexico told a differ-
ent story. Widespread horror was ertdent in many parts of the country 
over the murder of Madero who was looked upon as a liberator. On the 
same day that the ambassador reported the unconditional submission ot 
Carranza, Consul Louis Hostetter wired from Hermosillio, the capital of 
Sonora, that conditions were asswai.llg a very serious aspect, ainoe a 
majority ot the people 1n the state were not in tavor ot General Huerta 
8Ibid., p. 751. 
9i3a'iter, on. cit. , IV, 240. 
lr..,, = -
1rior. Rel., 1913, p. 750. 
Ibid.:I)p. 756. 757. 
because of the assassinations.12 Four days previous to this time, 
Governor Carranza ot Coahuila had informed President Te.ft that the 
Maxican nation condemned the "villainous coup d'etat which deprived 
Mexico of her constitutional rulers by cowardly assassinations". He 
expressed hope that the United States government would not accept the 
Huerta regime founded upon "crime and treason".13 
Other consuls noted similar evidences of disorder and hostility 
to the new Mexican government. Consul-General Han.a from Monterey 
wired that the state ot Coahuila was in revolt; Consul Edwards re-
ported that conditions from the South and West did not show improTJRent 
and that every indication justified the prediction of a struggle which 
would prove to be a "real war" ; Consul Ellsworth telegraphed that 
Carranza'.s success at Monclova was unquestio.o.able; and Consul Thomas 
Bowman from Nogales, Sonora, stated that recruits continued to join 
armed forces against the Huerta government in what seemed tone "real 
sentiment of patriotism" .14 
In the United States, a few months later, an editorial in the 
Outlook maintained that it would take more than protestation trom 
General Huerta. to convince the world that the killing ot President 
Madero and Vice-President Suarez was not political assassination.15 
In a similar expression the Review 2!,Reviews intormed its readers 
that Huerta promised protection to foreign capital and thet Ambassador 
l2Ibid., P• 751. 
13Ibid., p. 742. 
14Ib1d., pp. 752,762,777,784,785. 
15"Dointall ~ Dee.th ,2!. lla.dero, CIII (March 1, 1913), 461,462. 
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Wilson publicly expressed his opinion that the proTisional government 
was innocent of the murders. But the article poin~ed out that in the 
United States and in Europe generally it was believed ~hat Madero was 
murdered with the complicity ot the government.16 In a summary ot the 
Mexican situation, Current Opinion 9Xplained that Za.pata ot Morelos 
denounced Huerta and Diaz as the greatest enemies ot Mexico. It at-
firmed that Huerta's power was no more effective in restoring order 
than that of Madero.17 
Meanwhile, at Washington , an important event, which was to dis-
arrange completely the ambassador's plans, took place when, on March 
4, 1913, the Tatt administration retired and Woodrow Wilson became 
president ot the United States. From that time on the llexiean policy 
underwent great changes. 
From the dispatches of Ambassador Wilson may be tound, perhaps, 
the first hint of this change, when he protested, on .March 9, to the 
state department that only a simple acknowledgment and "that merely 
addressed to him as General Huerta" had been received in answer to 
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Huerta's telegram ot congratulations to President Wilson on the latter's 
ine.uguration.18 
In spite ot the new American administration's failure to recognize 
Huerta as president of exico, the ambassador continued to work tor the 
provisional government by minimizing the nature and extent 01' reTolt 
against Huerta. On March 11, he notified Secretary Bryan that carranza 
l6"Death ot Madero: End of his Regime''. XI.VII (April, 1913}, 403,404. 
17"The Mexican Situation", LV (July, 1913}, 11,12. 
18.For • .E.!!.•, ~. p. 760. 
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had been defeated and had retreated to Monclova, where his forces would 
in all probability be dispersed. He then advised the department as to 
the attitude of the consuls and suggested that, it any of the consuls 
had inadvertently been sympathizing with local activities against the 
federal government, they should be instructed to work for submission to 
the federal authorities, by which alone peace could be restored.19 
On the same day (March ll, 1913) that the ambassador wired this 
counsel to Washington, President Wilson surprised diplomats of the world 
when he announced: 
We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power 
of government to advance their own personal interests or ambitions. 
We ••• hold that just government rests always upon the consent of 
the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based 
upon law and upon the public conscience and approval •••• 20 
As his policy approached crystallization, the American president 
held that the Huerta government was not a ~ Jure government because it 
was initiated by crime and founded on the same principle, and that it 
was not a ~ facto government because it had not the power to perform 
the most elemental functions of government.21 The new president was 
said to have interpreted the Mexican conflict not as a struggle between 
ambitious men, "seeking power, plunder, and privilege" but as an effort 
of a down-trodden people against oppression of a ruling class. He re-
garded Madero as a sincere, if impractical, ruler.22 
At one time he stated that his passion was for the submerged 85 
l9Ibid., PP• 763, 764. 
2VBaker, .2R.. cit. , IV, 
2l"Jiexico: A""'iieview" 
22 ' Baker, .22.• ill•, IV, 
242. 
Outlook, CV (November 22, 1913), 614. 
244. 
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percent ot Mexicans who were fighting tor liberty, and again that he had 
to pause and rem.ind himself' that he was president ot the United States 
and not of a small group of Americans ~1th vested interests in Mexico.23 
In the end the Wilson administration proposed to isolate General Huerta 
and declared that, if he did not "retire by force of circumstances", it 
would become the "duty of the United States to use less peaceful means 
to put him out".24 
Atter President Wilson's failure to heed the ambassador's demands 
tor recognition of Huerta, the new policy was especially disappointing 
to Ambassador ilson but not to the extent that he ceased his support 
of Huerta. He had little confidence in the president's idealism or in 
the success of a Mexican government not based upon force.25 On March 
12, he wrote first in an apologetic manner that he had anticipated only 
a mild torm of coup d'etat in Mexico and that by announcing publicly 
his acceptance of the ot:ffcial account of the death of the prisoners, he 
adopted the surest method of allaying sentimentality which might have 
led to greater crimes. He then informed Secretary Bryan that unless 
the same type of government, as was maintained by Porfirio Diaz, was 
again established, new revolutionary movements would break forth.26 
On March 30, the same day that Carranza proclaimed himself pro-
visional president, Ambassador Wilson wrote that ttthe necessity for 
immediate meeting tor the consideration of recognitiontt had been 
23Ibid., pp. 261, 244. 
24Gruening, 21?.• cit., p. 578. 
25aaker, 21?.• c1t:-;-1v, 242. 
26For. S!!.·, 1913, PP• 772, 776. 
urged upon him by his diplomatic colleagues. Through the months of 
April, May, and June, he frequently urged suppor~ of Huerta for "the 
peace and good will of the continent" and "upon the high grounds of 
international polity, .American interests, and procurement of peace 
and order in Mexico".27 
At Washington, the ambassador•s reports kept the department of 
state well informed with concrete knowledge of immediate conditions 
in Mexico. But, on the other hand, they filled President Wilson with 
distrust of the ambassador whose activities he believed were in the 
interest or the larger business elements in Mexico. Perhaps this dis-
trust lffiS evident when the president sent William Bayard Hale, a bril-
liant journalist, to the republic to learn more of the true situation, 
and who, upon returning to the United States, made extensive reports 
many of which were highly critical of the Huerta government and or 
the part played by Ambassador Wilson in Mexican affairs.28 
While President Wilson continued to make a careful study- or the 
situation, the ambassador apparently grew 1.mpatient and wired the de-
partment of state, on June 9, that although he had been the president's 
personal representative at the post for more than three months, he 
had not been put in possession of the attitude of the administration 
on the question of recognition and that he respectfully requested the 
views of the president to be transmitted by telegraph.29 
Five days later, the administration torwa.rded trom Washington 
:7Ibid., pp. 784, 790, 799, 807. 
8iiaker, 211· cit. , IV, 243. 
29:For. Ii!!.•, 191..'3, p. 807. 
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detinite instructions which avoided any promise of recognition but · 
stated that the United States was convinced that Within Mexico itself 
there was a tundamental lack ot oontidence in good faith ot those in 
control or exico City and in their intentions to safeguard consti-
tutional rights and methods of action.30 
These instructions evidently did not satisty Ambassador Wilson 
nor cause him to alter his attitude toward Huerta. Rather, by asking 
Huerta to dine at the American Embassy, he shocked both the president 
and Secretary Bryan. At a cabinet meeting, President ilson wrote as 
memoranda: "I think Wilson should be recalled" • .As a matter or tact, 
Hale's presence in exico was bitterly resented by the ambassador as 
videnced by his protest to Washington against such interferenee.31 
Ambassadorial notes of this•type plus the indictments ma.de in 
Hale's report, no doubt, caused President Wilson to write Secretary 
Bryan on J'uly l, that he should like to discuss w1 th him "the necessity 
ot recalling Henry Lane Wilson in one way or another, or perhaps calling 
him to Washington for consultation".32 Two days later, the president 
again wrote Bryan that after res.ding Hale 's report, he hoped more than 
ever that the secretary ot state "would consider the possibility ot 
recalling Henry Lane ilson".33 
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While his rate at Washington wa.s under consideration, the ambassador 
renewed his efforts tor recognition by wire, t,o Mr.. Bryan, July 9. He 
30i3aker, 2l?.• cit., IV, 254. 
31Ib1d. -
32Ibid., P• 255. 
33ibid., PP• 255, 256. 
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explained that he was again obliged to urge upon the president the 
pressing necessity tor some action of a drastic and convincing kind 
that would convince the Mexican government and people that citizens 
of the United States must be protected in life and property, and that 
the barbarou.s and inh.wnan warfare which had been waged for three 
years would cease.34 
President Wilson's response to this note was to call the ambassador 
to Washington for consultation with his removal in the background.35 
.Arriving by boat at .New York, Ambassador Wilson explained that he 
found many reporters on dock seeking an interview and that "for the 
purpose of arousing public opinion" he gave to the correspondents 
"an outline of true conditions" which prevailed in Mexico. This 
story, he wrote several years later, "was f'aithtully reproduced by 
the press" and furnished the "first true picture of the actual do-
ings and conditions south ot the Rio Granden.36 
But his "true picture" was not accepted by the press with per-
feet harmony. Editorially, the Outloo! round that he "shocked the 
press and public by his undiplomatic discussion of Mexican matters" 
and that, because or his attempts to clear Huerta trom the assassi-
nations, many editors saw him as Huerta's agent rather than a repre-
sentative of the United States governm.ent.37 The Literary Digest 
explained that, during his first meeting with reporters at New York, 
34.for. Rel., 1913, pp. 808, 809. 
3~- --~aker, .2.R.• cit., p. 262. 
36lienry Lane filson, Dipl.omatic Episodes ,!!. Mexico, Belgium, ~ 
Chile, p. 312. 
3'7"Th• Mexican Puzzle", CIV, {August 9, 1913), '781, ?82. 
the ambassador was said to haTe expressed resentment toward the new 
administration tor sending special representatives to Mexioo instead 
of relying s olely upon his advice.38 'lhe ·Nation described the "indis-
creet" interview in the following manner: 
When he talked to reporters at all about his delicate mission, 
he made a huge blunder, tor a talking ambassador 1s always a nui-
sance and a peril. Even it he were the wisest and most energetic 
ot men, he should not regard himself as the only man in Washington 
capable or speaking on the Mexican situation. Nobody can be an 
oracle on an affair so wide and Taried nor is anyone more subject 
to ·m1stake and narrow views than the Jllan on the spot. 39 
From New York, Mr. Wilson went to Washington where he met the 
president at the White House, July 25. In writing of this meeting, 
the ambassador explained that he was pleased with the president's 
affable and pleasant demeanour but noticed "a certain inflexibility 
ot preconceived views" llhich rendered a taithtul presentation ot the 
situation difficult. The president showed a "lack ot knowledge ot 
the psychology and facts of the situation", and according to the 
ambassador, "1 t was quite evident that he had not availed hilllSelt of 
the information accessible to him at the Department of State". 40 
As to the president's knowledge of the Mexican situation, a mem-
ber ot the Wilson cabinet believed him to be well informed. Even be-
tore his inauguration, President ilson was advised or the status of 
Mexican affairs by the ass istant secretary ot state, Huntil18ton Wilson. 
All reports of the American ambassador, with COJIIR8n:ts troll experts 111 
the state department, were placed 1n his hands, and many letters or 
73 
38wMediation as a Remedy tor Mexico", XLVII, (August 9, 1913),193-195. 
39"Tb.e Mexican Difficulty", XCII, (July 31, 1913), 92. 
40wilson, ~· ill.•, p. 313. 
memoranda trom interYentionists or those who had pro;erty at e~ak 
re ched the hits House. According to Ray Stannard Baker, the pres!-
dent had undoubtedly studied the exican problem before his first 
cabinet meeting on rch ?, tor there was a danger that "his hands 
might be forced by th ill-advised activity• of those who desired a 
gol'ernment that would be amenable to their interests, regardless of 
its sanctions.41 
A tew days after his consultation with the president, Mr. 1laon 
was inTited to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations. To 
this group, it is said that he expressed his opinions with "becoming 
moderation" and made a favorable impression upon some ot the members. 
He recommended imlD.ediate recognition ot Hue~ who would restore a 
sound tooting. Huerta's "abyss", the ambassador was said to main-
tain, was financial and not military.•2 
Perhaps, anything the ambassador might have done was insufficient 
to place him 1n the good graces ot the Wilson administration. The 
torce behind him had ceased to have political value. The most ardent 
ettorts ot his Mexico City clique, which overw-helmed the state depart-
ment 1th telegrams, pamphl.ets, and delegations to 'ashington, did not 
convince the president ot the necessity of retaining his services. On 
August 4, nine days atter his arriTal at aw York City, • Bryan in-
tor.med him that the president had decided to ccept his resignation, 
which had been tendered according to diplomatic custom at the change ot 
41:eaker, on. cit., pp. 64, 238. 4., .::..;.. -,;-,Bell, .21!.• ill_., p. 356; "The xican PUzzle", Outlook~- ill•, 
pp. 781, 782. 
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administration on March 4.43 
According to the note from Secretory Bryan, the ai."llbassador was dis-
m.isse~ because his views were so widely divergent from those of the presi-
dent. Mr. Stannard Baker f'elt that he was recalled because "it became 
clear that the araba.ssador was not only opposed to the purposes of his 
chief', but was doing his best to defeat them and yet clinging to his 
ott'icer•. In reality, he was of no use to the Wilson administration. 
With reference to the Mexican problem as it stood, the ambasse.dor had 
nothing acceptable to ofter. 
On 1tugust 4, 1913, Henry Lane Wilson retired to private life and 
became a sharp critic ot President Wilson's Mexican policy. Within 
e few weeks after his retirement, his article entitled, 0 The Latest 
Phase of the Mexican S1t1rntion'*, appeared in the Ind.ependen't magazine. 
Though brief in content, the e.rticle vigourously attacked the president's 
demand for A constitutional election in Mexieo and main·te.ined that there 
neve!' would be a free election and a democratic people in Mexico until 
the government was guided by a strong man like General Diaz who should 
set eb-out educating end elevating the masses. The impression that 
!i!adero had been chosen by means of free end popular election was erron= 
eous, the former.ambassador asserted. since he received only 18,989 
votes out of a population of 15,ooo,ooo.44 
In the conduct of foreign relations, llll:r. Wilson held that "ideal-
iamtt ivas a dangerous element· and that "morals and expediencyn ~rare 
::Bell, .2R,e cit., p. 355; Gruening, op .. cit. t p. 676. 
Baker, .2£.• ..!?J.l., pp. 317,318,263; Bell, ER.· ill•, pp. 355,356. 
always or nearly always identical. Concluding the article, he declared 
that President Wilson was "under the guidance of sophisticated rheto-
rice.ns or amateur agents delving into fields ot whose soil they had 
not the most elemental knowledge'~45 
While considering Ja:r. ilson's argument that a strong man like 
form.er President Diaz was needed for a free election in Mexico, one 
must remember that Porfirio Diaz reigned supreme tor thirty-five years, 
and that at the end of his rule, the messes had not been "educated" and 
"elevated" to the extent that the dictator felt tree to grant them a 
popular eleotion. As tor the lla.dero elections, other persons saw in 
them the "semblance" of tree and universal suttre.ge.46 
Ernest Gruening held that the elections were "honest" and that no 
instructions other then "to tul:f'ill legitimate tunations had been given 
poll ottieial.s".47 Edwerd I. Bell, an American journalist, observed 
the balloting in two small districts ot Mexico City where almost 1,000 
votes were oast and tound it interesting to watch "the first tree elec-
tion ever held in Mexico". He claimed those who stated that Ma.dero's 
total vote was only 20,000 out or a possible 3,000,000 were in error, 
tor they had taken the number ot electors chosen at the primeries, and 
not those ot the whole electorate.48 In writing of the convention which 
nominated Madero and Pino Suarez, Charge d'Attaires Fred M. Deering 
telegraphed that the convention should be marked especially as the 
45Ibicl. ,~· Ruhle, lac. cit., pp. 18, 35. 
4.7 - -'Oo. cit., pp. 94, 95. 
48ie' -:.QR.. ill•, p. 119. 
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"tirst untrammeled political convention ever held in this country" and 
that it was tree, open, and or an admirable temper.49 
In June 1914, Mr. ilson read a paper before e meeting o:f' the 
American Academy or Political and Social Science. This article called, 
"Errors with Reference to Mexico and Events That Have Occurred There",50 
was ot considerable length and had for its major premise that the Huerta 
'17 
government should have been recognized. To begin with, the former am.bas-
sador lauded the Diaz government end at:f'irmed that the diete.tor, though 
not elected by constitutional methods, governed according to law; he 
tried to establish justice and he developed .American :friendship by in-
viting its capital and energy to Mexico. The American investors made 
great profits but le:f't greater ones tor Mexico. 
But as tor Madero, Mr. Wilson found that a vast majority o:f' Mexican 
public opinion was hostile to him from the beginning, that he paid no 
attention whatever to the lend question, and that his election was not 
a popular one. 
From his tour years experience, the former e1tbassador was able to 
say "without the slightest hesitation" that as a whole the Constitution-
e.lists, who were then arrayed against Huerta, ·were not only entirely 
out of keeping with our conception of what an honest people struggling 
tor liberty should be, but were "natural savages". 
That Diaz governed according to law, that he tried to establish 
justice, and that .American in•estors left greater profits to Mexico 
49For. Rel., 1911, p. 514. 
50'iuiie.ls ot the Academy Et. Political~ Social Science, LIV (July, 
1914) , 148-161. 
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then they themselves received were all statements which are questionable. 
Mr. Wilson tailed to substantiate them as tacts. Neither did he prove 
that a Tast majority of public opinion was against Madero from the be-
ginning. As tor the lend question, Madero had initiated a plan tor the 
division ot the large estates within tour months after his election.51 
The Constitutionalists, whom the former ambassador considered as natural 
saveges, later took over the reins of the Mexican government under the 
leadership of Obregon and Calles e.nd converted the Revolution into order-
ly goTernment. 
Finsl.ly, Mr. Wilson criticized the President ot the United States 
tor sending 1ohn Lind, e.n unotfieisl. delegate to treat with Huerta, 
but justified himself in the same article for making unofficial e.nd 
unauthorized representations to Madero tor the latter's resignation. 
The retired 8Dlbassador's attempts to defend his conduct in Mexico 
were based upon the old theory of "dollar diplomacy" which seemingly 
had disappeared with the close of the Taft administration. 
51Buttertield, "The Conspiracy Against Madero",~. cit., pp. 464-
482. 
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Che.pter VI. CONCLUSION 
For the "real war" which Consul Edwards correctly foresaw in his 
communication to Washington, llaroh 14, the Mexican people have from 
that day to this held Henry Lene Wilson in no small measure responsible. 
His responsibility was officially charged in Carranza's Manifesto to · 
the Nation of.June 11, 1915.l 
Before the inaugur ation of a Constitutionalist president, after 
the overthrow ot Me.dero, the map ot Mexico had been painted with a 
"blood-red circle". During the uprisings after the advent of Huerta, 
thousands of Mexicans lost their lives in battle, by massacres, and 
through incidental murders. Multitudes suffered hardships and lost 
their property. Cities were wrecked and rural districts devastated. 
Americans were murdered in numbers, and Mexican hatred of .Americans 
became bitter and enduring. 
It is t he belief ot Edward I . Bell that many of these evils might 
have been prevented by more judicious action on the part of the United 
States ei-ter the accession of Madero. It is true that throughout the 
Madero administration President Tett's attitude was friendly end his 
language, even when it conveyed threats, was temperate and courteous. 
But there was one matter in which the United States was "persistently 
and fatally" unfriendly to Mexi co trom the beginning of lle.dero's rule 
until its end)~ 
President Tatt maintained in Mexico an ambassador who was "lament- · 
i°ruening, ER.• ill•, p. 575. 
~. ill•, pp. 415-417. 
ably missplaced» unsympathetic. unjudicioua, and disastrously ha.rlirl'ul" e 
Believing that M.adero narrowly missed a trium.pb. over his enemies, Mr.-
!ell felt that the rig.ht man in the place - one who earnestly desired 
the established. government to continue because of what might :follow 
1 'Gs overthrm1 - <!oulil have lent enough support to ::!adero to Js:ee:p him 
in offfot) unt:il the r11.nds of the :masses had been turned ·to1}Jard peaceful 
raeans o.f living. As dean of the diplomatic corps and representative of 
the most p,:iwerful nation in 20xiean affairs, E.e:nry lane VJilson m.igh t 
have been able to be11efi t the Madero administration. A.s it was, he 
was hostile to it throughout and :tirtally hel;ped to b:ring about its 
downfall by means of taeties not consonant with diplomatic practice. 
Having actively aided i:n the overtbro1.,v of ,:i, legal government of 
a.not.her nation, Mr. Wilson then tl:1rew the entire weight; of M,s energy 
and i:n:fluence to the suppor·t of a regime entrenched by force, treachery, 
and assassirua tion. B,2, did so in the face of popular opposition ill 
Mexico and age.inst 'the policy of his own. government at 1JJashington. 
In his efforts to justify his actions• the .American. ambassador frequent-
ly explained tlla t Madero .was weak, impreotieal, and ince.pable of pre-
serving order in 11exico. But, on the other hand, he made every effort 
possible to force upon tb.e liexic,::;n r:eo:,:,1le t, regimo whtoh failed, from 
the beginning, to stem the tide of revolt. 
&a. ;~. Vf:ilson' s aa1i·ice concerning !1uerta' s recognition been 
followed, it i.s possible thot another epoch of' Por:f'ir112tJ.1ism, safe for 
foreigners, would have :follovrad in Mexico for severi2.l years. J,t least, 
it iii rather- certain. th~,t Huerta's success woulc, hava ra;;,tored a die-
t::1 torshi:p nnd presu'Uc,.bly law and order. In tl\:ts case, the wpnnt-uptt 
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torces ot misery, which was so prevalent under Diaz, would merely have 
waited tor a chance to explode. The exican people demanded reforms, 
as has been indicated by the trend of legislation since 191?. 
It is not likely that an "iron man" such as Huerta promised to be 
~ould have sponsored a program flexible enough to admit reforms of a 
permanent and beneficial nature. 
1.he evidence tound in .making this study indicates that Ambassador 
Wilson's activities were not motivated so .lllll:ch by what was considerei 
best for the people or Mexico e.nd the relationship of that country to 
the United States, but b7 the desires of his close friends in Mexico 
City who had selfish interests at stake. As for &ore specific indict-
ments against the conduct ot lienrJ Lane ilson as a. diplomat, this 
writer believes there are Jllany. 
He brought about the suppression of the Mexican press - an act 
which would not be tolerated in this country, even under similar cir-
cums te.nees. He harassed the Madero government with various grievances 
many of which were not real. Whe:n the opportuni. ty presented 1 tselt, 
he entered into the plans tor the overthrow ot a government which had 
been established by honest elections. He failed to make sufi'icient 
arrange.m.ents to safeguard the lite of the president he had helped to 
depose. Be :falsified his reports to American consuls and to the 
United States government in order to secure the recognition of a 
usurping regi.m.e which proved to be ina equate to perform the functions 
ot govermaent in exico. And finally h.e further aroused Mexican re-
sentment ot Americans so much that it be-eame a more-enduring hatred. 
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In conclusion, it may be said that Henry Lane Wilson played a 
decisiTe part in oTerturning the popular and democratically-intentioned 
goTernment or Francisco J4adero. 1th.out the militant encouragement and 
support ot the Amerlcan ambassador, the treason ot Huerta might neTer 
have been conceived. But from the moment ot the fatal coup d'etat on 
February 18 and the murder ot the president and vice-president tour 
days later. llexico was to be rent asunder with contwsion and blood-
shed. The problems that might haTe been worked out through pea.cetul 
meallS, however blunderingly and ineffectively, were destined tor years 
to be submerged 1n chaos. Causes tor friction and misunderstanding 
between the United States and Mexico were increased. A solution to 
the difficulty of more pleasant relations between the two countries 
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